



**MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE**



Marine Corps Gazette

SEPTEMBER 1949

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THIS MONTH'S COVER: Liberty bound from the aircraft carrier *Midway* is this group of marines. Carriers and marines are representative of today's fleet for they are symbolic of the principle of the balanced fleet. This month's feature article emphasizes our naval supremacy and points up the fact that sea power is not limited to ships alone, but embodies all weapons capable of using the mobility offered by the ocean highroads of invasion. See *Sea Power—A New Testament*.

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THIS MONTH AND NEXT: For the first time in about four years, the GAZETTE is *almost* over-staffed. This, we add hastily, is a most temporary condition—one which will have been cured by the time this issue is mailed. Maj James A. Pounds, III, and Capt James R. Stockman will assume, with the next issue, the duties of editor and publisher and managing editor respectively. Some of their efforts have gone into this issue. Under the new regime, changes in format and style will inevitably appear in the magazine, and this is as it should be. But you can be sure that there will be no reduction in quality: hard times may cut out a few of the frills, but the substance will still be there. The words "retrograde movement" have no place in the Marine Corps vocabulary. And, finally, the GAZETTE will always be just as good as the support it gets from the Corps—and that means YOU.

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Under the Big Top



Emmett Kelly, the famous clown, and a youthful admirer at the Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus in Madison Square Garden.



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We mention this because it tells a great deal about the kind of people in the telephone business. They try to be good neighbors and good citizens, as well as good telephone people.

The very nature of telephone work brings them close to the lives and the problems and the emergencies of many people. Their spirit of helpfulness and service extends to many activities beyond the job.

It may be a welfare drive. Or being ever-ready to lend a hand in worth-while community affairs. Or just by helping a number of orphaned youngsters have a happy day at the circus.

TO THE EDITOR

Message Center

The Changing Corps . . .

DEAR SIR:

Lately, I have been keeping up with the series of articles, *The Thin Line of Tradition*, by LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., which is currently being printed in the GAZETTE.

As the age-old saying goes, "There's always two sides to every question." Therefore, I would like to give one enlisted man's opinion on this highly controversial subject of adhering to tradition.

There are many reasons that could be given as to why tradition and custom, like everything else in this changing world, become outdated and need to be discarded, thrown away.

But, the strongest one in my mind is the example of our own nation, grown to its present size and power, not by clinging to habits and customs that pass with the years, but by ever looking forward into the future, always ready and eager to discard the present environment for something newer and better.

As the native mountaineer with his Kentucky rifle went the way of yesterday; so must our time-worn customs and traditions go. In their day, they were the best, but in our present modern Marine Corps, they have no place. Right now, our Corps is fighting for its life. Our most lethal weapon in this fight is the proof that we are ready to accept the challenge of ever changing modernization. Proof that we can tear ourselves away from the "Old Corps" way of doing things and keep our Marine Corps always on the advance.

This can only be done by accepting new rules, customs, and traditions and placing the old ones carefully under museum glass to be viewed on Marine Corps Birthdays, remembered and respected.

THOMAS R. HARPER,
Sergeant, USMCR.

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

A Common Language . . .

DEAR SIR:

The undersigned found the article *Looking at Origins* which appeared on the back cover of the GAZETTE for May, 1949, most interesting and informative.

While all services have their own picturesque lingo, undoubtedly the Marines are far ahead when it comes to the development of a colorful, salty, and ear-arresting vocabulary.

Commonplace expressions such as, "Leathernecks, scuttlebutt, Gyrene," etc., are now understood by any school boy and your "boot" readily succumbs to such expressions as "snapped-in, secured, head, sack-hound, Semper Fi, pogey-bait," and countless others, some of which are unprintable. No old time Marine officer could talk five minutes to a junior newcomer without using "stow your gear," "get squared away," etc., after the initial "Welcome aboard" greeting.

While using such pungent phrases and expressions every day, it is doubtful if many of the "Globe and Anchor" boys really know their origin. I'm frank to confess that I don't.

Can you or any salty old "bell-tapper" tell me whence originated such standbys as boondocks, ear banger, snow-job, knock it off, blow smoke rings, apple polisher, and squared-away?

Small wonder that all marines are said to speak a common language.

C. A. JAMISON
Major, USMCR.

Case for the D. I. . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have read the letter, *Percentage of Goms*, by Cpl L. C. Main, USMCR. In my opinion, he merely scratched the surface in criticizing the appearance of the incubator marine fresh out of boot camp.

When and where do we form our habits and traits that will mold us into tomorrow's citizens? Starting at the time of birth with our parents and elders as our instructors and our inspiration. In the Marine Corps, this responsibility belongs with the drill instructor. The day that the raw recruit arrives at San Diego or Parris Island, he unknowingly decides to pattern himself or herself after the best marine they know. In most instances, that living symbol is the DI.

Some of the finest men I know are performing the intricate, nerve-grinding duties of the drill field. But I regret to say

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Message Center

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that in my unofficial estimation, they form a small percentage of the elite organization of the Corps. Many intelligent clean cut NCOs have steered clear of the drill field because of the long hours and extra responsibility with no special compensation. Their fellow men with less tedious duties share on an equal basis in promotions and privileges. Give the marine some incentive to want to be a DI. A contented marine is an efficient one. With this type at the wheel, I am sure that we will see some improvement in the finished product.

FRANCIS NIGRA,
MSgt, USMC.

Morale, Tradition, and Rates . . .

DEAR SIR:

I had almost come to the conclusion that the GAZETTE's staff was completely unaware of the Marine Corps' morale situation until I read the significant and courageous article by Sgt Holt in the June issue, *Leadership and the New Marine Corps*.

My only real criticism lies in the bold face summary on page 10. The sergeant may have taken on too big a problem, but only because he was vastly aware that those problems do exist. Don Quixote charged the flailing arms of the windmills thinking that they were gigantic enemies—but they weren't. Sgt Holt, however, addresses himself to a very real problem facing the Corps.

My inclination is to go along with the author when he urges the relegation to the Boy Scouts of hobby shops, ping pong tournaments and the various other wiles of the Special Service people. These things simply aren't taking the desired effect, even assuming that the effect would actually be desirable.


Like most marines, though, I'm touchy about this tradition thing. I would hesitate to discredit tradition so thoroughly as does Sgt Holt. It's something of a chicken vs egg proposition—does tradition make the marine or does the marine make tradition? It probably works both ways. But this rate proposition is definitely a sore spot. To go so far as to make everyone below the rank of staff sergeant privates in status, defeats the purpose of the flexible seven-rate structure which the last 40 years of military history has proved so valuable, and smacks of the Japanese rate structure of privates, superior privates, etc.

Differing job responsibilities dictate the necessity of the seven rates we now have. Wouldn't it be more practical to revise our T/Os downward instead? Yes, revise the T/Os downward and freeze rates for a period of time to put re-

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Message Center

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sibilities in the hands of those who do on paper, but don't in practice, have the authority to assume these responsibilities.

Already I can hear the howls of protest from the many persons who feel a sharp pain in their toes at the mention of a rate freeze. But how many times have we seen a man promoted to sergeant, and what follows goes something like this: He writes home the first night and tells the folks all about it —how he now is a sergeant in the Marine Corps; by definition, a man among men, a qualified leader able to take over the company if the Skipper gets knocked off, an authority on small arms and a devil with the ladies. But is he? Well, probably not. As for his manliness, chances are he hasn't yet gotten up courage to tell mother that he smokes or drinks. Leadership? Yes, he has a hazy notion about hand and arm signals, and he was selected to drill during the last inspection. But it seems that he didn't give right shoulder before forward march, got completely snafu, and marched his snickering minions squarely in a company which was standing still before he could summon up the words, "To the rear."

Should this man receive an automatic promotion to the 3d pay grade in a couple of years, or should he begin to learn what is expected of him in his present rank? Does this oh-so-typical buck sergeant compare with the prewar model? I hope I'm not alone in thinking that he doesn't.

Perhaps a program somewhat along these lines could be developed. Freeze rates, with a few exceptions in the cases of those particularly outstanding, and let the vast quantity of unqualified NCOs dwindle by attrition to somewhere near a quantity proportionate to that of 1937-40. And, by all that's holy and virtuous, let us have some privates first class who are first class privates!

In most organizations, especially in the FMF, we are strikingly over-rated, sometimes as bad as Sgt Holt's headquarters company, and frequently worse. Why should a poorly trained staff sergeant hold down the job that a well trained and responsible corporal could handle just as efficiently, and incidentally, at less expense to the government.

And a PFC, while not by definition an NCO, should be a man to whom boots can come to and receive valuable advice and elementary instruction.

The whole problem is a bit too vast to be covered in a letter such as this, but I hope that I have gotten across a fair idea of my pet theory. At least Sgt Holt has faced up to the situation and the GAZETTE has seen fit to print his views on the matter. Perhaps it will set older and wiser heads to pondering on something approaching a genuine solution.

T. W. TURNER,
Corporal, USMC.

Parade Ground . . .**DEAR SIR:**

I want to heartily disagree with James H. Holt and his letter concerning the "Abolishment of the Blues." I believe Mr Holt to be entirely correct when he states that we are a fighting organization and not a parade ground outfit. But there are still some reasons for retaining the sharpest military uniform of the United States.

Although we are not strictly a parade ground organization, a vast amount of our pride of organization and our unequaled discipline is derived from the parade ground. The Marine Corps has shown time and again that a sharp parade organization is a disciplined, efficient, effective, fighting organization.

The famed Blues are a liberty uniform, therefore, the fighting man commands respect from all outsiders, both military and civilian. It instills in the marine an even greater *esprit de corps* than can be had through the strict use of greens and khakis, and no one can deny the importance of this pride of self and organization. It offers the marine a uniform which he may wear to the more formal occasions of entertainment.

Yes, Mr Holt, ask any marine about the Blues and he may say that they are uncomfortable, but he will not stand for their complete abolishment.

"J" "C" RAY,
Corporal, USMCR.

When a Man Marries . . .**DEAR SIR:**

In LtCol Heinl's necrology of Marine Corps traditions which have lapsed into disuse, one practice mentioned was the fact that prior to 1942 second lieutenants were not permitted to be married until completion of two years' service. This regulation was acceptable in pre-war times when the majority of second lieutenants of the Marine Corps were obtained from the Naval Academy, civilian colleges or other sources where these officers had little, if any, previous active Marine Corps service.

However, at the present time, the Marine Corps is offering commissions to enlisted marines who can pass a four year college equivalency examination. Should one of the requisites for qualification to take this exam be that the applicant be single and agree to remain unmarried until after two years' commissioned service, many staff NCOs who are career marines and excellent officer material, and who could successfully pass the examination would be prevented from being recommended to take it.

With the interest of these marines in mind perhaps it is best that this marital requirement not be revived, but remain one subject to be related when "old timers" gather to tell how tough it was in the "Old Corps."

JOSEPH E. MUIR,
2dLt, USMC.

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CAMP MEN'S SHOP

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Message Center

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NROTC vs. PLC . . .

DEAR SIR:

After reading and rereading Capt Valente's article entitled *What About The NROTC?*, I am not convinced that the Platoon Leaders Class is more suited to Marine Corps purposes. The Captain concluded his article with the statement, "A comparison of the two programs with regard to the regular officer seems to favor the Platoon Leaders Class both in cost of training and in type of training, and, in addition provides a better system for determining an applicant's desirability for the Marine Corps."

There is no doubt that the Platoon Leaders Class is the more economical in actual dollars saved, but in view of the increasing demand for education subsidized by the federal government, the NROTC program will give the government a greater return.

A PLC spends two six-week periods at Quantico during which he receives a total of 512 hours of military training. This is all he receives prior to being commissioned. The re-

sult is that he has been exposed to a number of subjects and has been indoctrinated in military life. How much of this he retains is questionable.

The regular NROTC student is sent to Quantico for eight weeks between his junior and senior year. He receives 354 hours of instruction in the eight weeks. In addition he receives five hours of instruction per week while in college and he has made two practice cruises. The contract student receives the same training as the regular while in college. His summer cruises are shorter and he is at Quantico for three weeks. Here he receives 137 hours of instruction. Even before coming to Quantico, the NROTC student is well acquainted with discipline, customs of the service, and military life.

The point that the training of the NROTC student is essentially naval will always be raised. The principles of leadership do not vary, their application is the same whether on a naval vessel or in a rifle platoon. The two hours per week devoted to drill should be used to instruct the students who have elected the Marine Corps in close order drill, weapons, or other subjects not covered by the three Marine Science courses.

The variety of sources from which the Marine Corps procures officers necessitates that all instruction at The Basic School be given with the assumption that the students have no

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previous knowledge of the subjects taught. Any advantages which may accrue from this assumption are offset by the volume, and speed of instruction. Under these circumstances, the greater background knowledge possessed by the officer who came from the NROTC is of greater value than the smattering possessed by the officer who came from the PLC program.

The PLC is observed for a maximum of 12 weeks; the NROTC student for four years. Selection of PLC applicants is limited to an interview by an officer who visits the various colleges. If the applicant is physically qualified and in good standing at this school, he is acceptable. If there are more applicants than the quota allows, the interviewing officer makes the selections. The weaknesses of the selection system are obvious when compared to the screening process of the NROTC program.

If the PLC is offered a regular commission and accepts it, there is still no guarantee he will make the Marine Corps his career. He is just as likely to put in his letter after two years as the officer who came from the NROTC.

Since one of the missions of the NROTC is to provide officers for the reserve components of the Navy and Marine Corps, the two programs should be examined in this light. The reserve officer who received his commission through the contract NROTC is, I believe, better qualified than one commissioned through the PLC program.

MACK R. MCCLURE,
2dLt, USMC.

To Have and to Hold . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have been following with interest the articles by LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr, *The Thin Line of Tradition*.

This brings to mind a practice of "the old Corps," suspended during the war, of the method of issuing weapons to a marine. In boot camp he was issued his weapon. This weapon was his "to have and to hold" until such time as he left the Corps or made platoon sergeant. He learned its number, kept it clean and spent many hours rubbing linseed oil into the stock to condition it and make it look sharp. A dirty weapon or dry stock was sure to bring the wrath of the gods (usually in the person of the squad leader) down on the head of the hapless individual. Of course, if it was too badly neglected, shelling out part of that hard-earned \$21 per, usually helped him to remember to take care of it next time.

Nowadays, it's a different weapon in every organization and it doesn't seem that the present day marines take as good care of their pieces as they used to. It seems to them that it's not worthwhile to oil that stock because they're going to turn it in when they're transferred. If he does take it to the rifle range and gets the dope on it, chances are next year he'll fire a different one.

I don't advocate a blanket return to "the old Corps," but I would like to see the return to the old method.

R. E. GIDLEY,
MSgt, USMC.

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
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Sea Power

A NEW TESTAMENT

THE UNITED STATES TODAY FINDS ITSELF IN A POSITION unparalleled in modern history. Not since Rome crushed Carthage has any nation enjoyed the naval primacy which is ours today. Alone we command over 60 per cent of the world's naval might, and, in alliance with the United Kingdom, the navies of the two nations comprise virtually 90 per cent of the world's naval force.

But it is not easy for us to comprehend the consequences of such naval power, because naval science has been developed in an era of keen naval rivalry, not naval dominance. Naval strategists, therefore, have been preoccupied with the naval warfare this rivalry produced. No nation had ever secured the naval mastery required to turn its attentions to the problem of exploitation of its new realm—the seas of the world. For the seas were not secure; a combination of two or more powers was always a threat to the dominant sea power of the moment.

It will be difficult to erase the stamp of these centuries of naval rivalry from our minds. So strong is the idea that navies are designed only to fight hostile fleets that the thought has been expressed that our fleet has outlived its usefulness because it lacks a possible enemy counterpart with which to do battle.

The history of the past centuries, with their Trafalgars,

Capt Schanzle's interest in seapower dates back to Guadalcanal, where he served with the 1st Marine Division. He is now a salesman in Newton Highlands, Massachusetts.

Jutlands, and Pearl Harbors, has served to emphasize sea power in terms of naval battles. The silent, over-bearing pressure that a sea power exerts upon its victim is far less dramatic, and in consequence poorly understood. Now it is apparent that these Trafalgars, Jutlands, and Pearl Harbors that fill the pages of naval history are the symptoms of imperfect ocean command. Or, to put it differently, they were produced by a situation in which one nation had naval superiority, but in which several perhaps had powerful fleets. And in such a situation the weaker power could always hope for the happy combination of factors that would permit it to defeat the stronger naval force and secure the superiority for itself. The battles of Trafalgar, Jutland, and Pearl Harbor were just such attempts. But with the overwhelming naval power we hold today such encounters are unlikely, and their absence will be the strongest announcement of our sea power. The imperfect ocean command of the past centuries produced poor exploitation of sea power. For, as long as any smaller naval power possessed a fleet capable of a powerful excursion, the dominant naval power was forced to devote a large share of its energy to preparations to defeat this attack. Thus little energy could be spared to the problem of exploiting its control of the seas. The situation was similar to that of a hard pressed farmer who defends his acres from hostile Indians, but in defending his land leaves half of it untilled.

But from 1943 to 1945 all this changed. The destruction of the German, Italian, and Japanese fleets, with the

The shores of the most populous and productive nations of the globe are washed by oceans we control. To our enemies these oceans are barriers they must hurdle before striking us. To America they are highroads to the doorsteps of our enemy

wartime hypertrophy of the British and American navies combined to produce the naval monopoly we contemplate today. This monopoly may outline the shape of any future war. Only England and the United States possess the power for ocean command, and if these nations are allied, it seems clear that our enemies, by elimination, must be land powers.

It has come to us not to struggle for sea power, but to gather the prize of its realization. But with our control of the seas we inherit the problem of how best to exploit and develop this control while maintaining it against a host of new enemies. For, while we have shown that our navy's problem is no longer the destruction of hostile fleets, since it is unlikely that we can be opposed again by a hostile fleet, we have yet to solve the new problem of naval operations against our new enemy, land powers, and their retaliation against us.

TODAY WE DOMINATE THE OCEANS OF THE WORLD. The shores of the most populous and productive nations of the globe are washed by the oceans we control. To our enemies these oceans are barriers that must be hurdled before they can strike us. To America these seas are a highroad to the doorstep of the enemy.

In essence this sea power extends our national boundaries to the farthest oceans of the world. It places our outpost line a few miles from the enemies' coast, or at least thousands of miles nearer to him than he is to us. This nearness is our advantage. With it, if we choose, we can parry and turn aside our enemies' blows directed at America and return heavy blows of our own. And this nearness is a fluid, not a static thing. It is where we want it. It is not concrete or stone, it is not located in such and such a place, easy to pinpoint and perhaps to destroy. Our fleet may be standing far out to sea or lying close off shore. Hence sea power is concealment. Whole fleets can disappear in a wide ocean. We learned at Pearl Harbor that a great fleet could approach our shores undetected despite the fact that it had been at sea for many days.

Sea power is also mobility. It is mobility not confined to roads or mountain passes, but a freedom of movement as broad as the seas themselves.

But sea power extends our boundaries and confers the benefits of mobility and concealment upon us only if we seize these advantages. If we fail in this, our sea power will be little help to us, or discomfort to the enemy. But if we grasp this ocean command it can give us the greatest advantage a nation at war could possess.

Keeping in mind that it will be the purpose of this essay to suggest only a line of thinking rather than an exhaustive search into the subject, let us examine the impact of this naval primacy upon the Navy at war.

Briefly the functions of the Navy could be separated into three general missions:


1. The maintenance of ocean control.
2. The exploitation of ocean control.
3. The defense of our homeland.

Let us explore the first mission. The maintenance of sea power is the traditional role of the Navy. Under this title the Navy must address itself to the problem of keeping the seas free for our merchant and naval vessels. Enemy submarines must be kept at arm's length, hostile aircraft must be repelled, and, should enemy surface vessels intrude, these must be destroyed. But there seems little doubt that, lacking an opposing surface fleet, the principal weapons the Navy must defeat in accomplishing this mission will be aircraft, submarines, and guided missiles. Inasmuch as we are already well equipped to dispose of any venturesome surface craft, the Navy must concentrate upon weapons designed to defeat aerial and submarine attack.

Enemy submarines in particular will be tough opponents, for the development of this craft is currently ahead of the development of anti-submarine devices.

The submarine is presently designed to attack surface vessels by torpedo. Submarines are built around this weapon, and torpedoes are of little use against land targets. Consequently, unless the submarine is rearmed with radically new weapons, its usefulness to us will depend upon the availability of sea-going targets, which of course include enemy submarines. But to an enemy our vast naval and merchant fleets provide a target so lucrative that he could prudently spend billions to develop this naval weapon for use against us. To our enemy the submarine will likely be the principal naval weapon. To us it must probably be subordinate. This confronts us with one of the oddities of naval science. The United States in the completeness of her ocean power will be attacked in her own element by a weapon which the enemy's weakness may prevent us from using against him. For it becomes apparent that our use of submarines will depend upon the enemy's strength. If we sweep his ships from all the seas of the world, we will have limited use of the submarine as presently armed.

To use submarines a nation must have easy access to the sea. To illustrate: Soviet Russia is at a disadvantage



The Missouri. Our ten modern battleships might be used to deliver heavy hit-and-run attacks against enemy targets so powerful that high speed in the retirement would be essential.

in submarine warfare. She must always be, unless she seizes most of Europe, for only then can she secure easy access to the Atlantic Ocean. In her present situation Russia has European naval bases only in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Arctic Ocean. On the Pacific coast her naval bases at Dairen and Vladivostok are pretty well hemmed in by the Japanese islands. A moment's reference to the map will illustrate Russia's unfortunate naval geography.

THE BALTIC SEA is narrow and, worse yet, empties into the North Sea through the narrow straits north of Denmark or through the Kiel Canal. Such narrow exits can be closely patrolled and mined from the air. Or, if this fails, a mine barrage, such as used in World War I in the Dover Strait and in the North Sea from Scotland to Norway, could be employed to isolate the North Sea and any Russian submarines that escaped into it. To prevent this isolation Russia must do as the Nazis did, capture the French Atlantic ports.

But while the capture of the French Atlantic ports would involve a hostile power in a land campaign of the first magnitude, we must face the fact that such a seizure is a distinct possibility. With the French coast in the control of a powerful nation we would find our problems in the Atlantic greatly magnified. If Brest, St Nazaire, and Lorient again become bases for enemy submarines, we would be obliged to employ large naval forces in frequent attacks to neutralize these bases. While it is probable that

we could neutralize them, the forces involved would be considerable and would serve to weaken our naval offensive elsewhere. But although hostile possession of the Atlantic ports would cause us profound inconvenience, we must realize that a power like Russia must conquer a continent in order to seize these ports.

The geography of the Black Sea likewise forces Russia to conduct a land offensive if her naval forces based there are ever to operate on the high seas. Here the Russians must force the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to enter the Mediterranean. And to leave that inland sea she must break through the Suez Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar. Such a move would involve Russia in a land campaign to conquer Turkey to gain entrance to the Mediterranean. To get out of the Mediterranean she must conquer at least the Holy Land, Egypt, and Spain or North Africa.

Russia could operate Murmansk as a submarine base, but its distance from the sea lanes of the world would greatly limit its usefulness.

In the Pacific Russia is little better off. There she has two bases, Dairen and Vladivostok. Vladivostok fronts on the Sea of Japan, which joins the Pacific only through several narrow straits north and south of Japan. Dairen is at the foot of the Yellow Sea. Any ship leaving Dairen for the Pacific must pass through the Ryukyu Islands. Thus, to secure unimpeded entrance to the Pacific, Russia must capture or neutralize the Japanese Islands.

The defense against aerial attack does not present an insuperable problem. One reason for this is the phenome-




A floating air base, the carrier can launch the latest type aircraft to strike massive blows at enemy targets.

nal development of the naval antiaircraft gun. The anti-aircraft defense of our ships during World War II was formidable indeed. But since then the development of the dual-purpose, 6-inch gun such as those on the USS *Worcester*, and the automatic 3-inch gun as mounted on the USS *Des Moines*, coupled with the miraculous efficiency of the proximity fuse, have provided us with new mighty antiaircraft weapons. As yet no comparable weapons exist on land.

Fleets have learned to survive and increase despite the torpedo, the mine, the submarine, and the airplane. We must now learn to repulse not only new forms of these old enemies, but also the new threat of guided missiles and atomic energy. The task may be formidable but hardly impossible. It takes only a moment of reflection to realize that a fleet at sea is easier to defend against these agents than any comparable structure on land. Moreover, the task of striking a moving vessel with a guided missile is much more complex than striking an immovable land target.

Atomic bombs could be used economically only on fleets narrowly concentrated, as at Bikini. A fleet at sea, widely dispersed, could hardly offer a sufficiently rewarding target for an atomic warhead at anywhere near the present cost.

But while our fleet at sea is a poor target, our naval bases on land are not. These massive installations, mostly located near or in large cities, are a perfect target for atomic weapons. They would certainly be crippled if the



Usefulness of the submarine with present armament depends upon sea-going targets.

surrounding city were successfully attacked. This problem has only a partial answer. In fighting the Pacific war we developed the fleet train to a degree previously thought impossible. We established complex and massive naval bases where none had existed before. But no matter how large our fleet train or how numerous our overseas bases, the Navy's life blood will flow from American ports. We must maintain and protect our American bases. The problem of their defense has yet to be solved.

But no matter how trying these problems of defense may be, we must solve them. For if we fail to do so, our second mission will be needless, since we may have little ocean control to exploit. Clearly, we must establish our control of the seas before we can exploit it.

Hence it is obvious that the second mission, the exploitation of ocean control, is predicated upon the successful accomplishment of the maintenance of ocean control. In this second role of exploitation the Navy must strike against the hostile land powers themselves. In this mission, naval air power will be the chief weapon. But naval aviation can reach full effectiveness only in co-operation with, and probably in subordination to, the United States Air Force. Together, these two mutually complementary air services can prepare the ground for the final invasion by Army and Marine divisions. We must further realize that each of the three services, Army, Air Force, and Navy, can fully develop its value to the nation only when each service understands that it is an auxiliary to the other two.

Let us consider some aspects of this naval offensive against a land power. The number of potential targets for such naval power is limited principally by the imagination. We have today the weapons for such attack; our fleet includes about one hundred aircraft-carriers. These great ships give us unparalleled airbase-mobility, for the naval aircraft carrier, which was created as a purely naval instrument, has now emerged as the handmaiden of air power.

With fleets of such mobile air bases we have landing fields that can concentrate and disperse, strike massive blows and vanish. They give us the means to concentrate air power against an enemy air force perhaps dispersed and surprised. They may provide us the means to furnish fighter support to air force bombardment groups when on long missions beyond the range of their land based fighter support. Simultaneously, they give us nearby bases from which to launch naval bombardment planes against targets too distant for our air force to strike efficiently. These carriers are also expendable. With the fleet of 100 carriers we have mobile air bases for 5,000 planes of the type used in World War II. New jet planes and larger bombers may reduce the number of planes carried, but such a reduction in numbers would surely be compensated for by the increased efficiency of new type aircraft.

IT IS HARD to place tactical limitations on such a carrier force because such limits are governed principally by the capabilities of the aircraft they carry. As a speculation, let us assume that naval bombers capable of a striking radius of 2,000 miles are developed. With such aircraft virtually no city in Europe, including European Russia, is immune to naval based bomber attack from carriers in European waters.

Such a force could strike at the industrial fabric of an enemy nation, and in support of such an attack we have the heaviest artillery the world affords — naval gunfire.

Our fleet presently includes 18 battleships; one of these, the *Kentucky*, is as yet incomplete, and it is probable that she will carry armaments radically new in type. Although eight of these battleships are of older classes constructed during and just after World War I, these ships were largely modernized during World War II. Our new naval dominance gives these older ships a new lease on life. Their lack of speed, which rendered them obsolete in battle line combat, is now of far less consequence in a new war where conventional battle lines may not exist. These ships, although old, are massively armored and intricately compartmented. Their main batteries are only slightly less powerful than those of the most modern *Iowa* class. Protected by naval fighters and anti-submarine screen, they can demolish coastal cities within range of their guns as effectively as hun-

dreds of bombers. Further, in this new naval era they can expend virtually all of their ammunition instead of maintaining the customary reserve to engage hostile battleships, probably non-existent.

These older vessels have already demonstrated their value in such roles. In the Japanese war these ships expended thousands of rounds in reducing shore positions. The old naval maxim that warships could not duel with shore batteries has been thoroughly disproven. Indeed, once within their range little can survive their massive, accurately-adjusted fire.

Our 10 modern battleships could also be used in such roles, if not needed for duties in which their high speed would be required. Or perhaps they might be used to deliver heavy hit-and-run attacks against targets so powerful that high speed in the retirement would be essential.

But our battleships are not the only vessels that can carry out bombardment missions against land targets. For we have in our 73 light and heavy cruisers weapons far more numerous and less costly that could perform brilliantly in such roles. Even the destroyers have in their 5-inch main batteries weapons comparable to 155mm field artillery. But neither naval aircraft nor naval gunfire can seize and hold enemy ground. Only a landing force can accomplish this.

Our landing force, the Fleet Marine Force, has developed as a fearsome instrument of naval warfare. As long as it exists, no citadel or city that has a neighboring beach can feel secure from attack and seizure. The invasion of the Pacific Islands, the landings in Italy and France, clearly demonstrate that no redoubt is strong enough to repulse a properly supported landing force.

Further, a landing force afloat in transports can by the mere threat of its existence exert profound inconvenience upon the enemy. Napoleon once said, "With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs, the English can paralyze 300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second class power." Thus, with an amphibious force of a few divisions, we can force the enemy to immobilize many times that number in purely defensive roles. For despite the increased mobility of modern motorized armies, they are still far less mobile than a similar force afloat in transports.

AN ARMY ON LAND depends upon railroads, highways, and bridges. Mountain ranges can canalize their movements, and mud and ice can severely limit mobility. Even in the best weather these land transportation arteries offer possibilities for successful interdiction by air attack which the approach by sea does not present. To transport a large army by land from one point to another, certain roads will be used and specified rivers crossed.

These roads and rivers are known before the armies

begin their move. Bridges, railroads and highways can be destroyed, and the enemy army severely hampered. But who can foretell the route of a column of transports with precision. Even if known, sea routes contain no railroads or highways to be destroyed.

In considering landing operations, one must realize that it is generally cheaper, easier, and faster to supply an army across 3,000 miles of ocean than across 3,000 miles of land. As an illustration, it would be easier for American forces to mount an offensive in Europe than to wage a similar campaign in California, assuming, of course, that all supplies had to originate on the Atlantic seaboard. This is of course a generality, but it emphasizes the fact that the oceans which surround us are broad highways which exceed in tonnage capacity the world's finest railroad network.

¶ A LANDING FORCE can usually concentrate more troops in the assault than the defending force can muster; the heaviest artillery in the form of ships' guns can be used in colossal concentrations. In land warfare a 10-inch gun is huge indeed, their numbers are few, and their movements so difficult that only the most static of situations permit their employment. But our fleet can offer huge concentrations of 14-inch and 16-inch gunfire easily massed and precisely controlled and also capable of rapid movement to and from the battlefield. The numbers of 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch guns exist in hundreds and thousands. It is easy to see that our Navy controls the world's greatest arsenal of mobile heavy artillery.

But no matter how efficient or how well-trained, the Fleet Marine Force can never achieve the final decision against a first-class power. The force is too small. Under naval control it can seize naval objectives, it can establish beachheads, but the U. S. Army must deliver the knock-out blow. Hence the Navy can deliver the Army to the enemies' shores, it can help devastate the enemies' homelands, but from here the Army must carry the brunt of the load. For only the Army can destroy the enemies' divisions and seize his homelands.

The third mission, the defense of the homeland against aerial attack, is a new field not included within the Navy's first two missions. In the function of aerial defense the Navy again must be subordinate to the airforce, since the primary responsibility of this defense is one of the missions of the airforce. But naval carrier aviation could be of great assistance in accomplishing this mission.

¶ THE DEFENSE of our cities against hostile bombers naturally involves the interception and destruction of enemy bombers before they arrive over our cities. It is to our advantage to intercept enemy aircraft as far as possible from our shores. But at present writing the jet fighter is a short-winded instrument. If the range of


these jet fighters is not substantially increased, we may be forced to meet enemy aircraft only after they have flown uncomfortably close to their targets. But jet fighters based upon carriers could lengthen the reach of our defensive aircraft by thousands of miles. To secure efficiency in such a mission special fighter groups and task forces could be organized. The nucleus of such a force could be a light aircraft carrier basing principally fighter aircraft. A number of escort and radar picket vessels would be attached to this carrier. It would be the mission of certain of these vessels to protect against submarine and aerial attack. The rest could range far away from the carrier as radar picket vessels funneling information back to the mother carrier. Such a force could usually give early warning of a bombing attack, and its interceptors could strike the first blows at the enemy formation. Ten or so of such defensive task forces could provide a powerful outpost line in repelling enemy bombers.

But naval aviation can be of little assistance should hostile bombers strike at our cities across the polar ice cap. For since naval operations north of the Arctic Circle are extremely hazardous during most of the year, it seems extremely doubtful that our carriers could operate effectively in these waters.

But again geography comes to our aid. If enemy bombers are to strike at our industrial cities by the trans-polar route, they must not only hurdle the polar ice cap, but they must also fly over thousands of miles of our thinly populated northlands before arriving over their targets. This would seem to provide ample time for detection and interception by land based fighters.

¶ SEA POWER is the prize of the Navy. A navy is required to seize sea power, and a navy is required to maintain and exploit it. Historically, navies have existed to fight other navies, but since our fleet need no longer be bound by this classic mission, the Navy presents today to the nation an instrument by which most of the weapons of the military and air forces can be expanded into new fields. The naval aircraft carrier gives new range and flexibility to air power. Indeed, there seems little doubt that the chief striking force of the Navy will be aircraft. This is not a refutation of sea power, but the fulfillment of it, for the Navy is not certain weapons, a ship, a gun, or a plane; rather, the navy is the instrument that endows all weapons with the unparalleled mobility that the sea provides. The seas are a road that can support any burden. In our carriers we have mobile air-dromes. Our battleships and cruisers are massively armed fortifications. Our tankers and colliers are mobile storage depots. If need be, a factory could be sent to sea. In essence the Navy is the agency whose mission it is to test all weapons to determine whether they can be successfully employed at sea, and if they can, to employ them.

USMC



The commander who neglects the use of reconnaissance patrols and places too much emphasis on the study of maps is courting disaster. A Japanese proverb says: "One look is worth a hundred reports."

THE EYES HAVE IT

By Capt Victor A. Kleber, Jr

"WITHOUT ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE OF AN ENEMY'S movements, the greatest military talent is useless." So said Col McDougall, at one time superintendent of Britain's Royal Military College at Sandhurst. Frontinus, the Roman who wrote a Latin handbook on military strategy away back in the beginning of the Christian era, would have said "Amen" to that; and George Washington knew it years before Napoleon went to military school at Brienne.

Before the white man arrived in America, Indian tribes were undoubtedly spying on one another in their unceasing warfare; but ordinarily their spying consisted in inspecting from concealment the enemy's activities. Indian spying was of the type the white man has termed "scouting"—but none the less spying for all of that.

Although the physical instruments of warfare have grown increasingly noisier and more furiously destructive, and, the obsolete weapons of those days of the past are now displayed in museums as curios (just as ours one day will be), yet in that secret war whose means are artifice and guile there has been surprisingly little change.

Some sixteen hundred years before the birth of Christ military commanders were principally concerned with the reports of reconnaissance agencies and such concern is equally important today in modern warfare.

An important reconnaissance agency then as now is the reconnaissance patrol. Not only is such an agency ably suited to supplement other mediums of information and to provide a means of corroborating information reported by other sources, but it is restricted only by the limitation of time and space. Darkness and inclement weather are assets to such a patrol while hindering the operations of other reconnaissance agencies.

It has been written in military texts that patrolling, in addition to being an invaluable source of information, is most suited to preservation of high morale among our own troops, and it is this statement that I should like to discuss in some detail.

In sharp contrast to such writings, interrogation of troops engaged in patrolling in the past war in both the European and Pacific theaters of war shows conclusively that if anything patrolling served to lower morale—especially reconnaissance patrolling.

A report made immediately after the conclusion of World War II by Gen Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group contained the following statement: ". . . Divisions considered patrolling the most expensive and the hardest

method of obtaining information." In the light of this sentiment, commanders in the recent war were almost always reluctant to send out reconnaissance patrols, especially when there was a prospect the patrol would suffer casualties. It is said that they felt in most instances that the meager information obtained was not worth the price paid.

What caused this condition? Military men of various ranks answer such a question with one reply—lack of sufficient training—more in particular, a lack of simple instructions for the conduct of a reconnaissance patrol. This deficiency resulted in a want of confidence in patrol leaders, unnecessary interception by the enemy resulting in casualties and the failure of fulfilling assigned missions to bring back pertinent information to friendly lines.

MajGen Merritt A. Edson, USMC (Ret'd) possesses a record of combat leadership paralleled by few in the recent world conflict. When asked for suggestions concerning military training for the future, Gen Edson replied: "If I had to train my regiment over again I would stress small group training and the training of the individual. Scouting and patrolling would be emphasized and I should consider it my personal responsibility to see that all concerned really learned and applied it."

If reconnaissance patrolling is not conducive to heightening our offensive spirit the fault lies in insufficient training, not the lack of justification for such patrol missions.

Discussing this subject with some of my fellow officers I was surprised to find a preponderance of feeling to the effect that primary emphasis in training should be toward combat patrolling rather than reconnaissance patrolling, and little interest shown in the latter. It is believed that such a trend would be nothing short of a serious tactical error. A combat patrol is assigned the mission of accomplishing its objective by probable contact with the enemy. When the mission is completed the success of the patrol is known to the enemy as well as to us, and if he is a worthy adversary immediate steps will be taken to counteract and nullify any effect such a patrol might have had.

A reconnaissance patrol generally confines its activities to the acquisition of information unless it is assigned to

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keep contact with the enemy, and fights only in self-defense. If contact with the enemy is avoided and its assignment accomplished the reconnaissance patrol serves to deny hostile forces the fact that we have gained information. This is most advantageous to any commander.

To weigh the merits of one type of patrol against the other is nothing short of a poor comparison, and to discount interest in the information reported by a highly mobile observation post such as the reconnaissance patrol, is giving ourselves the green light on the road to military failure. Any capable commander exploits every known source of information concerning the enemy. This information must be so complete that from it the capabilities of the enemy may be determined. Knowing these capabilities, a commander can then adopt a course of action that will accomplish his mission in spite of any effort on the part of the enemy to prevent it.

Aware of the perpetual need for information of the enemy and terrain not under friendly control, Gen George S. Patton, Jr, constantly taught his subordinate commanders to heed such a maxim. In *War As I Knew It* he recounts an incident which took place shortly after the activation of his famed Third Army. Gen Patton visited troops near Countances and found an armored division sitting on a road, while its Headquarters, secreted behind an old church, was deeply engrossed in the study of maps. Upon asking why they had not crossed the Seine, the General was told they were making a study of it at the moment, but could not find a suitable place where it could be forded. Patton asked what effort had been made to find such a place and was informed that such was the purpose of the map study. Gen Patton goes on: "I then told them I had just waded across it, that it was not over two feet deep, and that the only

defense I knew about was one machine gun which had fired very inaccurately at me. I repeated the Japanese proverb: 'One look is worth a hundred reports,' and asked them why in hell they had not gone down to the river personally. They learned the lesson and from then on were a very great division." It would seem that the use of reconnaissance patrols in this instance was neglected. Frequent reconnaissance would have insured an unimpeded advance, according to Gen Patton. The lesson is clear. A commander who is served by inadequate intelligence is courting disaster. Napoleon learned this at Waterloo as did McDowell at the First Battle of Manassas. The Battle of the Bulge was the same type of failure for us even after the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, and the Germans suffered in like manner by failing to predict the locale of the Allied landing on the coast of France.

As has been already stated — If reconnaissance patrolling is not conducive to heightening our offensive spirit the fault lies in insufficient training, not the lack of justification for such patrol missions.

ON THE OTHER HAND we must heed Capt Charles B. McDonald in his book, *Company Commander*, when he expresses the feelings of many small unit leaders of the past war: "Sending out patrols became a mental hazard with me. Our nightly patrols to Cannon Company were not particularly dangerous, but I shuddered each time the battalion intelligence officer called for me to send out a patrol into the enemy lines. I would spend long weary hours awaiting their return, all the while cursing higher intelligence officers who seemed to have nothing more to do than send out patrols. I knew that a certain amount of patrolling was essential to determine enemy activity at our front, but oftentimes men were sent out

with ridiculous missions to get information we already knew from daylight observations, and had reported. I knew that some of the patrols accomplished little more than providing a neat, typewritten report to go to the next higher headquarters. I considered my company extremely fortunate to have no one killed in the dangerous patrolling, particularly after three men from Cannon Company were killed in an ambush in front of our position." The views of Capt McDonald and his cohorts can be directly attributed to faulty assignment of reconnaissance missions.

IT MIGHT BE WELL here to cite several guides for individuals concerned with the conduct, training or assignment of reconnaissance missions. These are not to be taken as blind dogmatic rules without flexibility, but rather as aids to increase the reasoning power of those individuals, in view of the dearth of information on practical combat reconnaissance.

When a patrol is sent out on a mission of reconnaissance there are certain things the leader and members

"... The collection of information concerning the enemy's strength, disposition, weapons, and the terrain features has been a vital factor in the success of every military operation since the dawn of history. Reconnaissance patrols furnish a commander the senses of sight and hearing ..."

should be told. They will not be recounted here because they are prescribed in current training data and publications. It is most desirable, however, to keep the number of assigned objectives for such a patrol to a minimum and definitely within the limits of its capabilities. Orders to the patrol should be few, simple, and specific. A well trained patrol will bring back certain additional information gathered in the course of its operations because the members are constantly aware of their commander's needs. Proper training furnishes the insurance for this requirement.

Lastly, reconnaissance personnel should be used only for reconnaissance missions. Frequently such personnel are assigned duties in combat involving everything but reconnaissance. This situation is paralleled by a sprinter, trained to a fine point to run the 100- to 220-yard dashes, but when the conference track meet takes place his coach enters him in the two-mile run. The result is obvious. The sprinter doesn't win the race — he doesn't even place — and his team fails to utilize his potential in its rightful place, thereby losing both the dash and the two-mile run.

World War II found many units with special groups organized to do nothing but reconnaissance patrolling. Selected officers and men were the composition of the special units. The consensus among the commanders who organized such groups was that it paid off in excellent dividends. The Alamo Scouts of the U. S. Sixth Army

was one such specialized patrolling unit. A typical mission of this group was executed in April 1945. While our forces were fighting for Balete Pass in the Philippines, air reconnaissance and guerrilla reports indicated that the enemy was heavily reinforcing the towns of Cordon and Ilagon to the North. It was imperative that reliable data on all enemy strengths and dispositions in the area be obtained. A team of Alamo Scouts was assigned the mission of reconnoitering the area.

To avoid numerous Japanese patrols watching the roads the Scouts moved to their objective cross-country. There the team set up observation posts and radio stations. It also organized the guerrillas in the area. From its vantage point this reconnaissance patrol obtained and reported in considerable detail much information of enemy strength, dispositions and movements. As the fighting of the main forces progressed northward, the enemy retired. The Scouts maintained contact with the withdrawing enemy and continued to furnish information to Sixth Army Headquarters. Suitable credit must be given to this patrol for constantly keeping their mission

in mind and using terrain, rapid movement and proper deployment to good advantage. Speed, in particular, merits major consideration in any type of patrolling for every minute wasted reduces the freedom of action desired by a higher commander.

Voluminous textbooks can be and have been written regarding the theory of reconnaissance and the patrols used for this purpose. This article contains but a few of the minimum essentials in the training of a reconnaissance patrol. It is felt Voltaire composed a rule applicable to all writers when he stated, in a letter to a friend: "I have not the time to write you a short letter so I will write you a long communication."

THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION concerning enemy and terrain has been a vital factor in the success of every military operation since the dawn of history. Reconnaissance furnishes a commander the senses of hearing and sight. Training to perfect such senses should be centralized and its aim should be the development of initiative, mental mobility and resourcefulness. The following extract from an official German Army journal in 1941 expresses to perfection that goal for which we must strive to be successful:

"Reconnaissance requires of both officers and men a degree of decision, of independent thinking and action, of broad technical knowledge and military skill such as is required of no other soldier."

USMC



The Soviet Ideological Offensive

By LtCol William R. Kintner, USA

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION BEARS NO RESEMBLANCE to the Socialist paradise conceived by Marx a hundred years ago, it employs the identical verbal artillery Marx first fired in the *Communist Manifesto*. Members of the American armed forces—the men occupying the trenches of Democracy—need to learn all they can about Communism's century-old, standardized propaganda shells. Only with this knowledge can they defend themselves against the relentless psychological offensive waged by the Kremlin.

Communist propaganda is not concerned with human reason; rather it seeks to make men act, or keep them from acting, or put to sleep groups which might oppose the Kremlin's schemes. A typical Communist propaganda campaign may first line up the workers against the bankers, while telling the butchers and bakers that the issue means nothing to them. As soon as the bankers are liquidated, the industrial workers are mobilized against the butchers and bakers, and the white-collar workers are told they have no interest in the struggle.

Communist psychological warfare aims at the time element of national power. It is not directly interested in the immediate promotion of territorial expansion, but rather in conquering the minds of its actual and potential opponents

Communist psychological warfare aims at the time element of national power. It is not directly interested in the immediate promotion of territorial expansion, but rather in conquering the minds of its opponents. This battle takes place in time rather than in space. With an identical aim, Hitler required from 1933 to 1939 to sow the seeds of national disunity in the minds of his potential opponents.

Soviet propaganda follows good tactics. It never invents a grievance. It exploits existing ones. It is always concrete. It times its slogans to agree with the varying intensity of the world political situation.

We can be grateful, however, that the Soviet propaganda employs only a very slight core of scientific psychology. It still uses, with little change, Marx's shrewd analysis of human hates and jealousies, and the eternal discontent of the underdog with the man on top. The Soviets have ignored the many discoveries of modern psychology because it offers a different explanation for human conduct than materialism. As a result, Soviet propaganda is often very heavy handed.

Despite this weakness, the Soviet ideological arsenal—made by Marx—is full of appealing time-bombs. The chief of these is called the materialistic interpretation of history, an illogical dogma but one which does have a definite propaganda allure. This dogma claims that Communism is inevitable, a slogan designated to stimulate recruiting for the Communist bandwagon. This seductive Marxian doctrine aims to make the devout Communist feel that he has a hand on the throttle of history and by his personal efforts can help create the earthly paradise.

This cardinal Communist myth maintains that a force within the atom is bound to act out a drama of which Communism will be the final end. Human consciousness, Communists assert, has no higher origin than the earth we walk upon. Our life is but a by-product of mud, air, and water. Just as the tail does not wag the dog, the Communists contend that ideas do not influence the course of history. On the other hand, the way men plant corn or build bridges plays a decisive role—leading toward Communism.

An off-shoot of this Communist mythology is the Soviet fable that all the infidel world outside the borders of the USSR is in a state of inescapable decline. This is potentially a very dangerous item for the Communists to spread, for if Western decline does not take place, what-

ever the reason, the whole armor of Soviet propaganda will rust away.


From the same agitational stew is the Marxian concept of profit. The Communists have concocted the propaganda piece that the only source of value in the world is the labor of human hands. What business men call profit the Communists call surplus value—the price of an item minus the cost of the labor required to make it. The Communist idea of surplus value is rejected by all sound economists because it ignores the influence of demand, quality, and quantity on prices. It also neglects the part which rareness plays in establishing value. If diamonds, for example, were as common as the sands of the Sahara they would be just as worthless.

By this mischievous theory of value, Communists hope to trick the laboring man into believing that he is being robbed, by teaching the worker that he alone supplies all that is of value to the world. Playing the other side of the street, it tries to give all non-manual workers a guilt complex by convincing them that they are living off the sweat of others.

The promotion of class struggle by means of the surplus value theory is a prime weapon of Communism. The idea of battle between classes was pillaged by Marx from earlier Socialist writers. Social inequalities and injustice have always existed, but throughout the world class hatreds are especially strong today as a result of intensive Communist propaganda. The growth of social antagonisms in the United States has been almost directly proportional to the virus of direct and indirect Communist propaganda injected into the American blood stream.

Another device that Communists use to promote social disintegration is the attack on private property. History has shown that the color of a man's political thinking and even his patriotism is closely related to his possession or lack of real property. Private property is especially hateful to Communism, for the totalitarian state must abolish private property in order to have the type of complete political control necessary to achieve its purpose. On this point Walter Lippmann once stated, "In every case when liberty has been challenged, the offense has begun with an attack on private property."

The block-buster of Soviet ideology is the contention that war is the handmaiden of Capitalism. As Joseph Stalin has explained, "Our Marxist analysis declares that the capitalist system of world economy conceals elements of crisis and war, that the development



of world capitalism does not follow a steady and even course forward, but proceeds through crisis and catastrophes." The object of this "line," of course, is to place the onus for war in the West and to justify all Soviet aggression as defense moves.

Marxism is the religion of materialism, consequently it can bear no rivalry from real religions. Almost without exception, a Communist must be a fanatical atheist. Religion is sometimes tolerated for political purposes within the Soviet sphere, but no man can become a member in any segment of the Communist Party if he professes religious beliefs. This ruling makes it impossible for anyone but an atheist to rise very high in the Soviet hierarchy.

Because the Marxist concept of life is materialistic, the

Soviets believe that man is entirely a creature of his environment. He is born into the world pure and uncontaminated, but as he grows the evil Capitalistic environment corrupts him. This concept enables the Communists to lay the blame for disorders which appear in every society on the system, and not, where it properly belongs, on man.

It is with this antiquated propaganda arsenal that the Communists make the vain claim to having the only true and scientific explanation of human life. Communist propaganda has the same content today as when Karl Marx processed it from the raw material of the 19th Century Socialist theories. "Scientific" means an understanding of things based on the widest possible study of fact. Whenever such facts can be consistently interpreted, a scientific explanation can be made, but the explanation itself should change as more significant facts are observed. For this reason, most scientific theories in every field undergo constant change or gradual modification. Marxism has not undergone any essential change during the past century. During this interval neither Marx nor any subsequent Communist has been able to prove Marxist theories scientifically. Marx attempted to prove them, in his own terms, by "The force of abstraction," whatever that is.

THE GREATER PART of Marxian literature, which the Soviet state holds to be scientific fact, consists of a misleading examination of history. Marx attempted to prove that under the Capitalist system conditions for the working man would become increasingly more unbearable. The failure of this basic prediction is the best means of disproving "scientific" Communism.

Marx said a hundred years ago: "If it were obligatory to provide the proper factory space for each workman the very root of the capitalist mode of production would be attacked . . . Machinery sweeps away every moral and material restriction on the length of the working day . . . Adulteration of food will follow the advance of capitalist production . . . The capitalist mode of production produces premature exhaustion and death." Because of these imaginary nightmares, Marx argued there was no hope in a progressive reform of the system. Only a revolution could free the world from the Capitalist curse. As events have shown, Marx was neither scientific nor prophetic in these forecasts. Nevertheless, such Marxian fairy tales form the kernel of Moscow's virulent propaganda today.

WHILE SOVIET COMMUNISM as conceived by Karl Marx and raised by the Kremlin has no title to the word "scientific," for propaganda purposes there is no particular reason why it should be scientific to succeed. The legend that Marxism is scientific has been spread by those who find it a convenient ladder to power. As this legend

must be maintained by them, they have surrounded it with pseudo-scientific veils and declared *Das Kapital* to be the Bible of the Communist faithful.

The ideological foundation of Marxism has undergone some secondary changes in Soviet hands. The changes that have taken place, however, have been changes in form rather than in substance. The Soviet goal remains the same, the tactics to reach that goal have varied.


The first major deviation from Marxist-Leninism introduced by Stalin was the idea that Russia was capable of achieving Socialism by itself. Previously Marxist dogma held that the Socialist development must take place simultaneously throughout the world.

Until this doctrine was developed, the Communists were convinced that all Europe would go communistic through the successful uprising of the proletariat. Believing this, they neglected to undermine the existing leadership strata in Europe. As a result, their abortive attempts at revolution during the early Twenties gave the leaders of Europe a new cohesion and won recruits for social stability. When the first floods of violent Communism subsided, Stalin announced for the first time that the USSR could stand alone in a hostile world. Afterwards, with the development of the United Front period of Soviet foreign policy, 1935-1939, greater flexibility became apparent.

THE UNITED FRONT slogan called for the joint struggle of the Communists and other "democratic" groups against Fascism. Previously, cooperation with non-Communists had been condemned. The Communists ceased being prisoners of their own ideology altogether and became pure opportunists the day they made the pact with Hitler in 1939. Until then Communists had defined Fascism as "Capitalism in its death state." But Molotov blandly asserted, after he had signed the Nazi Pact, that Fascism was only a "matter of taste." This was the strongest example of the sort of "Bolshevik realism," which has since characterized all Soviet foreign policy. In 1941 the Soviets made a drastic about face when they found themselves allied with the Western "degenerate" Democracies. When the war ended, the Kremlin pinned the Fascist label on the Western Democracies as soon as the Soviet need for their support was finished.

Soviet realism can be seen also in post-World War II innovations in Soviet propaganda. Current Communist propaganda makes a strong bid for peasant support throughout Europe, although formerly it had ignored the peasant. Apparently the Communists have realized that subversive political conquest, on which their plans are for the moment apparently based, cannot be achieved if the peasants actively resist them.

The Kremlin has also dramatically abandoned the internationalism of the early Soviet days for a type of hybrid-nationalism, recognizing that nationalism is still



a potent force in world politics. In essence, the revived Comintern program, aimed directly at the United States, is a confession that Communist revolution does not offer sufficient popular appeal to bring Europe into the Soviet fold. Therefore, their propaganda holds up the United States before the proud Europeans as the foe of all real sovereignty and national traditions. Evidently, the Soviets hope to make nationalism serve them, and as long as they win the real power they see no ideological difficulty in giving the European people this balm for their pride.

Such twists in Soviet propaganda have become common, but they are not invariable. Often the Soviets will reach far down into their hoax bag to pull out an old standby. But propaganda switches—even radical ones—do not imply changes in direction. The aim of a world to win, first proclaimed by Marx, still stands.


The unyielding objective, however, compels the Soviets to explain all their propaganda ruses in terms of basic Marxism. Yet, because of growing opportunism, tactical variations from the central propaganda theme will likely be more common in the future than they have been in the past. An understanding of the basic Marxist line will enable us to avoid the confusion generated by the shifts and turns of the Soviet propaganda mill. The sooner the free people of the world grasp the essential fraud of "scientific Marxism," the sooner will the Soviet psychological offensive be blunted and turned back. USMC

The Norway Failure

Part I: The Narvik Operation

By Maj Carl W. Hoffman

Photos from British Information Services



Britain's unbalanced fleet, over-supervision by the Admiralty, contradictory instructions between the attack and landing force commanders, failure to exploit an advantage gained, and lack of an adequate landing force led to defeat in Norway

IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1940, THE ALLIES and particularly Great Britain, suffered a disheartening disaster on the icy coasts of Norway. Britain's was the greatest navy in the world at the time, yet she was unable to wage successfully a naval campaign. For naval campaign it was. And failure it was.

At the outset, it should be made perfectly clear that the stimulation of an Anglo-American controversy on the subject of sea power is not the purpose of this article. For indeed, much of the short-sightedness exhibited by a large number of British political and military leaders between the two great wars was common to many Americans also. We *still* occasionally hear many of the arguments revived with all the vigor and fervor of a new discovery.

Early in World War II, the strategic importance of the Scandinavian Peninsula was apparent to both the British and the Germans. Germany needed Sweden's iron ore desperately; Hitler's war industry would virtually wither without it. The Swedish iron ore fields were located at Gaellivare—near the north-center of Sweden. In the summer months, Germany drew the ore from the port of Lulea, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and in the winter, when the gulf was frozen, from Narvik on the west coast of Norway. (See map.)

AT FIRST GLANCE it would seem a simple matter for Britain to stop these movements, in view of her strong fleet as compared to Germany's. The situation was greatly complicated, however, by the Norwegian corridor. This corridor was formed by an almost continuous fringe of islands which parallels the entire west coastline of Norway. Between these islands and the coast was neutral water, through which German traffic could nonchalantly communicate with the outer seas. This situation caused Mr Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, to write on 29 September 1939: "At the end of November the Gulf of Bothnia normally freezes, so that Swedish iron ore can be sent to Germany only through Oxelosund in the Baltic, or from Narvik at the north of Norway. Oxelosund can export only about one-fifth of the weight of ore Germany requires from Sweden. In winter normally the main trade is from Narvik, whence ships can pass down the west coast of Norway, and make the whole voyage to Germany without leaving territorial waters until inside the Skagerrak. It must be understood that an adequate supply of Swedish iron ore is vital to Germany, and the interception or prevention of these Narvik

supplies during the winter months . . . will greatly reduce her power of resistance."

In order to stop the German movements through the corridor and to force German ore-carrying ships onto the high seas, the First Lord proposed that a series of small minefields be laid at two or three suitable points along the coast. From September 1939 to April 1940, this recommendation was officially repeated on six occasions—unofficially on many more. Although all interested parties agreed that it was a necessary move, respect for Norway's neutrality proved the deterrent.

Almost simultaneous with Churchill's recommendation that certain areas in the Norwegian corridor be mined, Adm Raeder, Chief of the German Naval Staff, submitted a proposal to Adolf Hitler headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway." He stressed the disadvantages to Germany should the British occupy Norway: ". . . the control of the approaches to the Baltic, the outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, the end of our pressure on Sweden." The Admiral pointed out the advantages that would accrue to Germany in an occupation of Norway: ". . . outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier . . ." Hitler mulled over the idea for two short months, and then, on 14 December 1939, ordered his Supreme Command to prepare plans for an operation against Norway.

Russia, meanwhile, operating in the spirit of her pact with Germany, made demands on Finland—many of which the latter conceded. Nevertheless, on the last day of November 1939, Soviet armies marched across the Finnish frontier. A wave of sympathy for the Finns immediately swept Great Britain, France, and the United States, but it possessed no strength of action. A combined Anglo-French Expeditionary Force was hastily assembled and held in readiness awaiting permission from Norway and Sweden to let troops and supplies pass through their countries to Finland's aid.

Britain's willingness to aid Finland was occasioned by a sincere sympathy for the latter's sad plight. In addition, a means was presented of achieving a major strategic objective. If Narvik were used as an Allied base to aid the Finns, Germany could hardly use it to secure vitally needed iron ore shipments, and her use of the Norwegian corridor could be prevented conveniently. Fear-

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British Viewpoint

To get a British viewpoint, the GAZETTE asked LtCol H. A. Digby-Bell, RM, to comment on *The Norway Failure*. LtCol Digby-Bell's remarks, in part, follow:

"... We cannot learn too much from the many lessons of the last war—bitter as some of them are. In this campaign in Norway, so well covered by Major Hoffman in his article, I feel, however, that special mention should be made of the political necessity for allied support of the Norwegian people.

"In this emergency we needed to retain the moral support of Norway's people to bring over to our side her not inconsiderable tanker and merchant fleet. We needed to try and prevent the export of iron ores to Germany and we wanted to aid the Norwegian Royal House with which we had such close family ties.

"These factors, combined with a strong feeling of

leadership in a disintegrating Western Europe probably made our War Cabinet realise that some military gesture must be made to prove to Norway and the world that we would not leave a friendly country heartlessly to her fate.

"The majority of landings and battles in this campaign were fought at a time when we were on the retreat in Belgium and France. The attempted solution of every problem in the Narvik area was fraught with the realisation that before very long we should need every man, gun, and ship to defend our native shores. This picture of ultimate withdrawal hung like the sword of Damocles over the commanders' heads and it is one of the many psychological factors that are so often neglected by official historians."

Some of LtCol Digby-Bell's further remarks are included as footnotes to the article. They are identified by the initials HAD-B.

ful of becoming involved in the war, however, Norway and Sweden refused to cooperate in the enterprise. In the middle of March 1940, the badly managed Russian campaign ended. Finland was defeated.

While Britain worried about the possibility of further Russian moves against the Scandinavian countries, Hitler's plans were crystallizing.

CHURCHILL'S LONG-DEBATED PLAN for the mining of Norwegian waters finally came to fruition early on the morning of 8 April 1940. The minefield was laid by four destroyers off the entrance of West Fiord, the channel to the port of Narvik. The Norwegian government, still eager to remain neutral, feverishly drafted protests. It would soon have more to worry about.

The day following the mining operations, Denmark was invaded by the Germans. In a lightning move—contested only briefly by the King of Denmark's guard—the Nazis overran the country. News of the invasion did not reach Norway until she herself was struck.

Germany's invasion of Norway by sea and air transport was a daring move—especially since the greatly superior British Fleet was within striking distance. Hitler's forces descended at Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, and to the north at Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. The latter was their most cunning move. For a week, supposedly empty German ore ships had plied the neutral channels of the Norwegian corridor loaded with military supplies and ammunition. Like so many Trojan horses they enjoyed their sanctified privacy until joined by ten destroyers, each carrying 200 soldiers direct from Germany.¹

Two Norwegian warships gallantly contested the invader's approach, but both were quickly sunk and the capture of Narvik was speedy and economical.

History is replete with examples of the devastating effectiveness of surprise attacks. Surely, the German successes in Norway may to a large measure be credited to this important principle. Within 48 hours, all of the main ports were in German hands. And the invasion had been characterized by economy of force—nowhere did the initial landings use more than 2,000 troops. Three divisions were used in the assault phase and four more later reinforced through Oslo and Trondheim—a total of seven divisions. Important in the invasion had been 800 operational aircraft and 250-300 transport planes.

The German landings in Norway provided a golden opportunity for the British to strike counterblows. Two days after the invasion, Mr Churchill declared in the House of Commons: "We [are] greatly advantaged by what [has] occurred provided we act with the necessary vigor to profit from the strategical blunder which our mortal enemy has made." Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes wrote nearly three years later: "... a wonderful opportunity was open to us, if it had been pursued with ... daring and enterprise."

On the morning of the German invasion of Norway, Prime Minister Chamberlain summoned the War Cabinet to discuss the critical turn of events. At the meeting it was agreed that Adm Forbes, Commander-in-

¹British Naval Intelligence knew of the attempt to smuggle troops but, as Norway was a neutral country, it was impossible to get permission to take positive action until it was too late.—HAD-B

Chief of the Home Fleet (then cruising in Norwegian waters), should be instructed to take all possible steps to clear Bergen and Trondheim of enemy forces, and that the Chiefs of Staff should immediately start planning for the recapture of both those places and Narvik. Military expeditions, however, would not be undertaken until the naval situation was clarified.

That afternoon (9 April) French leaders flew to London and a Supreme War Council meeting was held. It was determined that strong forces should be sent to Norway to seize selected ports. A French Alpine division would embark in two or three days; the British would provide 11 battalions—two would embark that very night, five more within three days, and the remaining four within 14 days.

Meanwhile, the British and German Fleets had not been idle; a number of minor engagements had been fought in, or near to, Norwegian waters which had been costly to both participants. On the 8th, the day before the German invasion, the British destroyer *Glowworm* was sunk after ramming and crippling the German cruiser *Hipper*. On the 9th, the British battle-cruiser *Renown* got important hits on the German battle cruiser *Gneisenau*, but was unable to make a kill as the latter escaped under the smoke screen of a sister ship. And on the same day, Adm Forbes notified the Admiralty that he intended to send a force of cruisers and destroyers into the port of Bergen to destroy German shipping. After first concurring in the plan, the Admiralty later cancelled it on the grounds that the risk was too great.

Caution or risk—take your choice; while Adolf was making his gambles pay off, the British were immobilized with caution. Lord Nelson had said many years before: "Something must be left to chance. Our only consideration should be, is the honor and benefit to our country and its Allies worth the risk? If so, in God's name, let us get to work."

Mr Churchill with his characteristic willingness to admit his mistakes, later wrote: "Looking back on this affair, I consider that the Admiralty kept too close control upon the Commander-in-Chief, and after learning his original intentions to force a passage into Bergen, should have confined ourselves to sending him information."

While Adm Forbes was floating in a sea of cold water (on his plans as well as his ships), the Germans took the opportunity to launch strong air attacks against the Fleet. In these attacks, one destroyer was sunk, two cruisers were damaged, and the flagship *Rodney* was hit but not impaired.

His first plan over-ruled, Adm Forbes proposed that Bergen be raided by naval aircraft on April 10th. This the Admiralty approved, and in addition, arranged attacks by RAF bombers on the night of the 9th and by land-based naval aircraft on the morning of the 10th. These attacks were reasonably successful; the German




cruiser *Koenigsberg* was sunk. Similar attacks on Trondheim next day achieved no hits.

British submarines, meanwhile, were active in the waters near Norway. In addition to at least nine transports and supply ships which were sunk during the first week of the campaign, the subs sank a German cruiser and got a torpedo hit on a pocket battleship. But the losses were not reserved for the Germans alone; three of His Majesty's submarines were sunk in the month of April and other severe shipping losses were felt.

While plans to attack Bergen were being proposed, cancelled, revised, and executed, Adm Forbes ordered Capt Warburton-Lee, officer in command of destroyers, to proceed to Narvik and prevent a German seizure of that important port. The Admiralty informed Capt Warburton-Lee by radio that one German ship had already entered the port and debarked troops, but to "proceed to Narvik and sink or capture enemy ship. It is at your discretion to land forces, if you think you can capture Narvik from number of enemy present."

As he moved into West Fiord with his five destroyers, Capt Warburton-Lee was informed by Norwegian pilots that a German force of six ships larger than his own and a U-boat were already in the harbor. Warburton-Lee merely passed this information to higher echelons and signified his intention to attack at dawn. This message was heard by Adm Whitworth, aboard the



battle cruiser *Renown* who gave some thought to sending ships from his own squadron to bolster Warburton-Lee's meager quintet. He determined, however, that there was not sufficient time to execute the reinforcement and that a delay was undesirable. Even had Whitworth announced his plan, it would not have been permitted by the Admiralty. In this connection, the First Lord of the Admiralty writes: ". . . we . . . were not prepared to *risk* [author's italics] the *Renown*—one of our only two battle cruisers—in such an enterprise."²

And so, stout of heart on a blustery April 10th, Capt Warburton-Lee's five destroyers steamed up the fiord and into the harbor of Narvik. Things went well at first. Of five German destroyers in the harbor, two were sunk and the other three so effectively blanketed with fire that they offered no resistance. In addition, a total of eight German merchantmen were either sunk or destroyed. But then, just when it appeared that Warburton-Lee's bold stroke was to remain unchallenged, five German men-of-war hove into view and opened fire. In short order, the heavier guns of the Germans established fire superiority and of Lee's five destroyers, one was beached, one sunk and two damaged. Capt Warburton-Lee, aboard the *Hardy* was killed and his ship beached. The three destroyers that were still afloat steamed for the open sea. They made good their escape, and as chance would have it, encountered a large, unprotected enemy ammunition ship which was vengefully demolished.

On the 11th of April, as he spoke before the House of Commons, Mr Churchill was still convinced that the German moves were foolhardy: "Everyone must recognize

²Risk. In the words of Herodotus, Book VII: "I pray thee, fear not all things alike, nor count up every risk. For if in each matter that comes before us thou wilt look to all possible chances, never wilt thou achieve anything. Far better is it to have a stout heart always, and suffer one's share of evils, than to be ever fearing what may happen, and never incur a mischance."

the extraordinary and reckless gambling which has flung the whole German Fleet out upon the savage seas of war, as if it were a mere counter to be cast away for a particular operation. . . ."

Following a dive bombing attack on enemy shipping in Narvik harbor on the 12th, Adm Whitworth, aboard the battleship *Warspite*, with an escort of nine destroyers and an umbrella of naval aircraft from the carrier *Furious*, moved into West Fiord at noon on the 13th. This time it wasn't a case of sending a boy to do a man's job—the forces were adequate. The results were gratifying. Eight German destroyers and one submarine were sunk, as against no ship losses for the British. German troops, who had only arrived in Narvik a few days before, were driven into the hills.


After toying with the idea of sending a provisional landing party of sailors and marines ashore to seize the town, Adm Whitworth decided against it since it would be necessary to retain the *Warspite* in the waters off Narvik in order to provide support for such a landing. This, he felt, involved too much risk from German air and submarine attack. (The Admiralty's caution appears contagious.)³

Late in the afternoon, a number of German aircraft appeared on the scene and confirmed his anxieties. The next morning, therefore, he withdrew. Two destroyers were left off the port to observe and report any new developments. Whitworth then communicated his recommendation to the Admiralty: ". . . the enemy forces in Narvik were thoroughly frightened as a result of today's action. I recommend that the town be occupied without delay by the main landing force."

While these naval actions were occurring, plans for an expedition against selected ports in Norway were ripening. A seizure of Narvik clearly seemed within the capabilities of the Allies, whereas an operation against southern Norway was not within the means available. Narvik could be supported and maintained from the sea at a strength superior to anything which the Germans could move by land through 500 miles of mountain country. Trondheim, 372 miles to the south, had an important airdrome which could provide a base for British aircraft, as well as affording an excellent delaying position to contest a German advance to the north.⁴ These operations would not only improve the Norwegian morale (to realize that they were not in the war alone), but would serve a useful purpose to the entire Allied war effort. The British Cabinet whole-heartedly ap-

³The Narvik fjords were too narrow to allow evasive maneuvers under-way and we could not get the range to open AA fire because of the high mountains.—HAD-B

⁴The Trondheim operation—beginning after the Narvik operation and ending before it—is the subject of a separate article titled *The Norway Failure, Part II*.



British destroyers steam up Ofot Fiord towards Narvik during the second battle of Narvik. Eight German destroyers and one submarine were sunk as against no ship losses for the British forces.

proved and the wheels were set in motion. Narvik would be first.

Here in the planning stages, a crucial and regrettable error was made: the Navy and the Army, though actuated by the same purpose, gave separate instructions to their senior commanders. And even more serious, the instructions, once given, were not exchanged nor discussed between the two services. Thus Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery, senior Naval commander, was not acquainted with the Military Staff's instructions to MajGen Mackesy, the senior Army commander. The General, similarly, was not familiar with the Admiralty's instructions to Lord Cork.

That Narvik was to be seized, there was no question; the principal difference appears to have been in the manner in which it was to be done. To the Navy and Lord Cork, the best scheme was to hit hard—gambling if necessary—quickly exploiting any favorable opportunity that presented itself. In Lord Cork's own words: "My impression on leaving London was quite clear that it was desired by His Majesty's Government to turn the enemy out of Narvik at the *earliest possible moment*, [author's italics] and that I was to act with all promptitude in order to obtain this result."

Gen Mackesy's instructions from the Army gave no indication of a need for *promptitude*: ". . . Your initial task will be to establish your force at Harstad, [a small port on the island of Hinnoy, 120 miles from Narvik] insure the cooperation of Norwegian forces that may be there, and obtain the information necessary to enable you to plan your further operations. It is not intended that you should land in the face of opposition. . . The decision whether to land or not will be taken by the senior naval commander in consultation with you."

Prior instructions to Gen Mackesy had emphasized that bombardment of a "populated area in the hope of hitting a legitimate target . . . but which cannot be precisely located and identified" should be scrupulously avoided. This limitation on bombardment was later to prove an obstacle to Lord Cork's plans. The stress and mood of the two orders differed appreciably, though both were animated by the same purpose. Since Gallipoli many British military men had been hag-ridden by the notion that a combined operation (amphibious operation) against a defended beach must necessarily be destined to costly failure. This ingrained idea was perhaps responsible for that part of Mackesy's instructions which said: "It is not intended that you should land in the



Narvik Bay after the historic attack by British men-of-war during the early days of World War II.

face of opposition . . ." The General read his orders carefully.

On April 12, aboard separate ships, the Admiral and General departed from Britain, the latter in company with a brigade (24th Guards) of British soldiers. (It was then planned that three battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, plus other French troops, follow in a week or two.) The two commanders were to meet at Harstad—this much of the planning was familiar to both.

Two days out of port, Lord Cork received a message from Adm Whitworth, who had just withdrawn from Narvik waters after his successful attack. The message said in part: "I am convinced that Narvik can be taken by direct assault now without fear of meeting serious opposition on landing. I consider that the main landing force need only be small. . ."

A quick stroke of this nature was to Lord Cork's liking—he immediately sent a message to the British cruiser *Southampton* to meet the *Aurora* (Cork's flagship) in the Lofoten Islands, where a provisional landing force would be organized and put ashore at Narvik as soon

as possible. The Admiralty, however, put the kibosh on the scheme, saying that any move against Narvik should be made together with Gen Mackesy's force. A golden opportunity was thus lost—the Admiralty would rue that decision.

• HIS BOLD PLAN THWARTED, Lord Cork made for Harstad to join Gen Mackesy. The latter established his command post in a hotel in the city and let it be known that no amount of urging or argument would convince him that a direct attack against Narvik was feasible. The General was worried about German machine guns in Narvik and did not feel that naval bombardment would materially change the situation—nor did he feel (consistent with his instructions) that the city should be bombarded. Plus all that, his transports were not combat loaded.

Deadlock. Frustration. Snow. And in Narvik, the Germans cleaned their machine guns.

By the 17th of April, the Defense Committee of the War Cabinet was sufficiently disappointed with the lack of progress at Narvik to send a message to Lord Cork and Gen Mackesy (obviously aimed at the latter) saying in part:

"Full consideration should . . . be given by you to an assault upon Narvik covered by the [battleship] *Warspite* and the destroyers, which might also operate at Rombaks Fiord. The capture of the port and town would be an important success. We should like to receive from you the reasons why this is not possible, and your estimate of the degree of resistance to be expected on the waterfront. Matter most urgent."

• DOUBTLESSLY, the Committee expected some action following this message—they got none. If the general was fearful of having "blood on his hands," the message should have relieved him; the Committee had, in effect, shouldered the responsibility for a costly defeat and virtually absolved him of all blame should the decision prove wrong. But the General was unmoved; the snow would melt eventually, and he could then implement his preferred (to the exclusion of all others) plan of landing on an undefended beach and advancing on Narvik by land.

Here was a force of over 4,000 British troops, well supported by naval vessels (although there was a regrettable absence of naval aircraft) against a German force of about 2,000.⁵

Lord Cork was designated on April 20th as sole commander of naval, army, and air units in the Narvik area—placing Gen Mackesy under Lord Cork's command. It

⁵This figure represents the regular German troops at Narvik. From ships that had been sunk in Narvik waters, many seamen had made their way ashore. They were ill-equipped and untrained, however, for an infantry defense mission.



Scenes from the deck of a British cruiser during the bombardment and landing of troops in Narvik. British hesitated shelling the town because of the innocent Norwegians who would suffer.

had been hoped that this shift would bring about the direct assault—so long and often advocated. But the forces of inertia had reduced the expeditionary force to a state of torpid hibernation. The General could think of many reasons for not undertaking a decisive move against Narvik and the Admiral, not wishing to exert the full power lately accorded him, did not wish to dictate it.

With more German aircraft appearing over the Narvik area daily, and with a general increase in the number of planes which the Germans could bring to bear there, the situation was not improving. Summarizing the problem, Lord Cork wrote to Mr Churchill in part as follows: ". . . The initial error was that the original force started on the assumption they would meet no resistance. . . As it is, the soldiers have not yet got their reserves of small-arms ammunition, or water, but tons of stuff and personnel they do not want. . .

"What is really our one pressing need is fighters; we are so over-matched in the air. . . .

"It is exasperating not being able to get on, and I quite understand you wondering why we do not, but I assure you that it is not from want of desire to do so."

To BREAK THE STALEMATE, Lord Cork decided upon a reconnaissance-in-force, under an umbrella of naval bombardment—probably with the hope that if the reconnaissance units could establish themselves ashore, reinforcing troops could be poured in behind them. A dissenting opinion, however, was quickly forthcoming from Gen Mackesy. Again he called attention to the instructions relative to bombardment and stated that every member of his command would be ashamed to subject innocent Norwegians to a naval shelling. Lord Cork forwarded Mackesy's objection without comment. His silence spoke chapters. It is almost superfluous to

state that the Defense Committee backed Lord Cork.

On 24 April a three hour naval shelling, fired by the battleship *Warspite* and three cruisers, failed to dislodge the Narvik defenders. No assault of the beaches was attempted.

By the first week in May, the original Brigade which had accompanied Gen Mackesy from Britain was removed from the Narvik area and employed to the south in an effort to block the German advance from that direction. But Gen Mackesy remained. An influx of Polish, French, and Norwegian troops had built up the forces available for an attack on Narvik, there being four battalions of Polish troops, three battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion and a provisional Norwegian force of about 3,500 men.⁶

Nor had the Germans been idle; units from the 3d Mountain Division had reinforced the original garrison force and there was a general improvement of their defenses.

Finally, on the night of 12-13 May, a landing under Gen Mackesy was made at Bjerkvik (see map) with very little loss. Gen Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck, who had been sent from Britain to command all troops in Northern Norway arrived on the 13th and took over. His orders were to seize and defend a foothold in Norway and to sever shipments of iron ore to Germany. With the landing at Bjerkvik, the ball was at last rolling—but like a snowball pitched up hill, destined to roll back again, looming larger and faster on its descent. The avalanche of misunderstandings, over-caution, and inadequate planning which had all but enveloped the Norwegian campaign, forced a climactic decision from London on 24 May: Norway would be abandoned. This decision was arrived at not only because of the snail-like speed of the Narvik operation, nor because of the failures at Trondheim, but also and especially because of the German moves into the Low Countries and France. Following an invasion on 10 May, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg had quickly fallen; by the 16th, Hitler's forces had pierced the northwestern extension of France's Maginot Line; a train of events rapidly leading to the Dunkirk catastrophe (1 June) was well in motion.

The decision to abandon Norway made, it still became necessary to seize Narvik—both to achieve destruction of the port, and more important, to provide a covering position for the withdrawal. Narvik was finally seized, practically without losses, on 28 May, following a shore to shore movement across Rombaks Fiord by two Foreign Legion battalions and one Norwegian battalion. In a related action, Polish troops seized

⁶Lack of command liaison and the language difficulties made this a very difficult affair.—HAD-B

Beisford, 10 miles to the southeast of Narvik. The Germans retreated into the hills to the east. (See map.)

But, as has been indicated, the prize—so long in attainment—was soon released. The evacuation commenced almost immediately, and by June all troops and large amounts of supplies and equipment were "bound for the land they adore." The withdrawal, unchallenged by German ground forces, was covered by planes from two carriers (*Glorious* and *Ark Royal*) and a land-based squadron of RAF fighters. The latter landed on the *Glorious* and departed Narvik in that ship. In addition to the planes, Lord Cork had two cruisers and 16 destroyers to protect the retiring convoys.

As this evacuation was carried out in the same week as the more famous Dunkirk withdrawal, a severe strain was imposed on the British Fleet. It now appears that their dispersion of forces was too great. On the afternoon of 8 June, the German battle cruisers *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* spotted three British ships (carrier *Glorious* and two escorting destroyers) retiring from Narvik. In the ensuing battle, all three British ships were sunk with only about 60 survivors—the Germans' fire power was too much. The *Scharnhorst*, although sustaining heavy damage from a British torpedo, remained afloat and limped to safety.


Thus ended the abortive Norway campaign.

In analyzing the reasons for the Narvik failure, we could dwell on many specific points: unwillingness of the British to take a risk, over-supervision by the Admiralty, contradictory instructions from the Army and Navy, faulty coordination between the attack force and landing force commanders (even extending to embarkation in separate ships), failure to exploit an advantage gained, lack of an adequate landing force (under naval command). Tossed into the air, however, these critical points all boomerang and neatly arrange themselves under the heading of "Britain's Unbalanced Fleet."

The fact is that Great Britain, the greatest naval power in the world at that time, could not successfully wage a naval campaign against a relatively inferior naval power. The reason is not mysterious or obscure: the British Navy needed a stronger naval air arm (as protection against German aircraft and also as a potent offensive weapon against German installations), and a Fleet Marine Force to be landed when favorable opportunity presented itself.

The Narvik operation has mainly emphasized the need for a specialized landing force (Fleet Marine Force, if you will) under naval command. The Trondheim operation (which will be covered in *The Norway Failure, Part II*) underlines this fact—and in addition—presents even more forcibly the case for a strong naval air arm.

What had the failure meant to the world? Most importantly, perhaps, the highly vaunted British sea



An enemy destroyer beached in the inner part of Rombaks Fiord off Sildvika during the British naval action 13 April 1940. Failure of the English to follow up initial success was fatal.

power was revealed as insufficient to prevent a relatively weak sea power (Germany) from seizing an area entirely favorable to the exercise of sea power. The Norwegians, reeling from the hard punches of the Germans, were all but "on the ropes." Yet, in the hope that help was coming, they somehow were managing to carry on the battle as a semi-effective fighting body. Norway fell with the British evacuation. In Italy, a country which was already giving thought to joining the Germans, the British failure had the effect of proving that the winning side was, indeed, Adolf's, and that the British were not nearly as powerful as at one time believed. Italy declared war only two days after the British evacuation of Narvik. In Britain, the populace was shocked; they had had no illusions about the weakness of their ground forces, but they had always pictured their Navy as in-

vincible. The reversal was frustrating and depressing. To the Germans, this was just another indication of Hitler's genius—another feather in Der Führer's war-bonnet. Thus it may be seen, that the political and psychological implications of the Norway failure are weighty with significance.

The late James E. Forrestal, when he was Secretary of Defense, summarized the Norway failure in these words: "This disaster, which profoundly affected the course of the entire war, was more than the failure of 16,000 men, but was a failure in the exercise of sea power on the part of the then greatest navy in the world and is entirely due to the lack of a small, specially trained amphibious force such as we have in the form of the United States Marines, to supplement the action of the Fleet at sea."

US MC

In Brief

The Munitions Board has announced establishment of a Military Procurement Information Center to provide guidance to businessmen seeking contracts with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This is a move by the National Military Establishment to eliminate completely the need for middlemen of any kind between businessmen and the armed services. The central office will be staffed by procurement specialists from the three services, who will have on hand or will be able to obtain for a businessman on short notice information as to which service is buying what, and where.

Professional examinations for Women Marines are being prepared by the Testing and Educational Unit, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., and will be administered when they are distributed. Until the exams are administered, the lack of General Military Subject Test marks will not be prejudicial to Women Marines in considering their qualifications for promotion.

The Marine Corps Recruiting Service began accepting enlistments in the Regular Marine Corps for General Duty on 1 July for the first time since 1 March. The quota for July was 1,200 male enlistments. Reenlistments remained unlimited. Recruitment of women for regular service was continued in July with a quota of 50.

A new athletic rule book covering the All-Navy sports program is being prepared by the Physical Fitness and Athletic Section of BuPers. To be given wide distribution among ship and station activities, the booklet will include pertinent information on all branches of Navy organized sports, including the new policy on augmentation of teams as outlined in BuPers Circ, Ltr 70-49 (NDB, 30 April 1949).

The maximum age limit for prospective naval aviation cadets has been raised two years—to 27—thus opening the NavCad program to certain "highly desirable" men who might otherwise be excluded. The minimum age of 18 continues in effect. Enlisted men who are eligible for the program should consult a joint BuPers-MarCorps letter of 22 July 1948 (NDB 21 July 1948).

Marine Corps aviation will have a total of 120 jet fighters at the end of the current fiscal year, according to a recent letter from the Commandant to the Commanding General, 2d Marine Air Wing. Most of the jets will be Grumman F9F *Panthers* and McDonald F2H *Banshees*. By the end of fiscal 1950, the Navy hopes to have 280 jet fighters.

The first group of Women Marines to attend the Recruiters School began their course of instruction recently at Parris Island, S. C. A total of 35 students, six of whom are women, are enrolled in the course. This marks the first time since the school's activation in October 1947, that Women Marines have been so detailed.

A new model turbojet-powered carrier-based attack plane is being sought by the Navy as a result of the cancellation of the 65,000-ton supercarrier USS *United States*. Scaling down its future attack bomber from 100,000 pounds to about 65,000 pounds, with a somewhat reduced bomb load and a slight reduction in range is the task confronting the Navy at present. The big weight reduction is required by the fact that instead of the reinforced flush deck of the USS *United States*, Navy planes of the foreseeable future will be limited to the weaker and smaller flight decks of the 45,000-ton *Midway* class carriers.

Shifting of the bulk of its combatant vessels to the Atlantic and Mediterranean is being gradually accomplished by the Navy. Plans call for 409 ships to operate in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and 285 in the Pacific during the current (1950) fiscal year.

Full color television has been used by inspection personnel of the Wright Aeronautical Corporation to study imperfections in the performance of ram-jet engines. Members of the testing staff believe the recent test marked the first use of color television for investigation of jet operation. Earlier, engineers of the same company had utilized black-and-white television for the same purpose. Because much importance is attached to the flame color by judges of engine performance, the technicians regard color projection as of greater value in the experiment.

A new photographic viewfinder which presents an erect, unreversed, and clear image of the terrain below a moving aircraft has been developed by the engineers at the USAF Engineering Division's photographic laboratory, Dayton, Ohio. Using an eight-inch lens which can be mounted on the instrument panel, the photo-navigator or pilot may see at a glance an image of the ground or water immediately below, and ahead of his plane.

The Air Force will enlarge its Aviation Cadet program by opening an aviation cadet navigator school at Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas. The new school, designed to train navigators needed for air crews of the latest types of transports and bombers, will be patterned after the Aviation Cadet program in eligibility requirements and training. To be eligible, men must be between the ages of 20 and 26½, citizens of the U. S. and may be either single or married. They must have two years of college or the ability to pass an equivalent examination.

Fourth pay grade personnel of the regular Marine Corps and Reserve (organized and inactive) are now eligible for enrollment in the following subcourses of the Officers Basic Extension course

- B-1, Basic Indoctrination
- B-2, Administration (suspended pending revision).
- B-3, Naval Law
- B-4, Map and Aerial Photograph Reading
- B-5, Basic Individual Training
- B-6, Enforcement of Military Law and Order
- B-7, Basic Infantry Tactics
- B-11, Leadership and Troop Training (will be available about Oct 49).

For detailed information concerning Marine Corps Schools Extension Courses write directly to the Director, Extension Division, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

Army Ground Forces have been reorganized in order to increase efficiency in training, eliminate duplication, and streamline the organization of the Department of the Army. The new designation for AGF is Office, Chief, Army Field Forces. Under the new organization the commanding generals of the six armies in the continental United States now will be responsible to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

A total of 2,719 pilots, co-pilots and flight engineers for the Berlin Airlift have been graduated from the Continental Division, Military Air Transport Service, "Vittles" Replacement Training Unit at Great Falls, Montana, according to a recent report from Division Headquarters, Kelly AFB. The Replacement Unit has turned out 1,046 pilots, 827 co-pilots and 846 flight engineers since the first class started 11 October 1948. Nine classes completed RTU training in 1948 and so far this year 27 classes have been graduated.

The jeep and the jet plane may work as a team in the operation of a new mobile aircraft energizer, recently developed to lighten the load placed on aircraft batteries. Because of the need for weight conservation, batteries in modern planes can be depended upon for peak power production over short periods only. Battery makers have discovered that the units furnished for jet aircraft supply about enough power for three starting actions. If the starting attempts are not completed, crews must use auxiliary batteries or replace those in the plane. When an energizer is mounted on a jeep constant voltage can be delivered to guarantee a sure start.

Detailed joint planning by unified staffs is in progress on the West Coast, and on the Island of Oahu in preparation for Exercise Miki, which is designed to dislodge an imaginary "aggressor" from the Hawaiian Islands this fall. About 40,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines will participate in this operation. Large-scale training already is under way and will increase in intensity until late September or October when the invasion force will board nearly 100 ships for a rehearsal assault at Aliso Canyon, near San Diego, Calif., before launching the operation against Oahu.

A self-contained unit for the field testing of petroleum fuels and lubricants, light enough to be air-transportable, has been manufactured according to the plans prepared by the Quartermaster Corps. Built into a 4-wheel trailer, the mobile laboratory is said to be equipped to test all grades of gasoline, fuel and lubricating oils, and grease. Precise analyses are facilitated by special devices capable of maintaining any desired critical range of temperature down to 100 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. No outside source is required to provide electrical power to heat control.



It is ideal if a close personal friendship can be developed between the commanding officer and inspector-instructor, establishing a firm base for understanding between the regulars and reserves.

The I-I Meets the CO Halfway

By LtCol Ronald R. Van Stockum

As THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE ROUNDS OUT ITS third year of post-war development, many new faces will appear in the ranks of the inspector-instructors. One of them may be yours. Perhaps you are fearful of what has been described as a "quasi-civilian" status and are plagued by doubts and uncertainties about your ability, after years of regular service, to adjust yourself to your new duties. On the other hand, perhaps you relish this assignment and are determined to sweep with a new broom, to organize the Organized Reserve, "to put a little discipline into that non-regular outfit."

In either case, regardless of your attitude, you have undoubtedly read LtCol Fleps' splendid article in last October's issue of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and realize that "Reserve Duty is No Frolic." With one exception, that discourse covered adequately the trials and tribulations, the blessings and the rewards incident to duty with the Organized Reserve. Col Fleps can be forgiven this oversight, for in the Air Reserve set-up, as Commanding Officer, Marine Air Detachment (or "MAD" CO, as he often called himself), he was actually in command of the

reserve squadrons with which he was associated.

We are referring to that eternal bugaboo, the relationship of the inspector-instructor to his counterpart, the reserve commanding officer. The purpose of this article is to shed a little light on this difficult relationship which, supports in delicate balance the fate of a reserve unit.

BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER, let us examine the elements with which we have to deal—the organized reserve (ground) unit and the inspector-instructor's staff. Units will vary as to size, type, and organization, but the problems to be discussed here and the solutions offered will apply to all in a greater or lesser degree, whether it be a battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery, or any other ground reserve unit which is involved.

The organized reserve has not been "stream-lined" for atomic warfare. In nearly every particular, its components are based upon the tables of organization which were in effect at the war's end. The rolls, reports, and routine correspondence required of them are every bit as voluminous as those that were exacted of similar units

Accustomed to obeying orders promptly and to exacting immediate compliance in turn, the regular on duty with reserves finds himself knee-deep in frustration. To accomplish the best results he must make a sympathetic approach to his problems

during the war. When correspondence of purely reserve nature, recruiting, and property accountability are added to this load, the administrative burden assumes staggering proportions. In fact, the statement of one war-harassed staff officer explaining why he didn't read his own orders, "Read 'em? Hell, I can't even lift 'em," could without a great stretch of the imagination be applied to the reserve today.

As a full-time adjunct to each reserve unit, there is assigned an inspector-instructor and his staff of one or two officers and several enlisted men, depending upon the size and type of the unit with which they are associated. This small group of regulars and continuous active duty reservists has no direct command function although the inspector-instructor is interposed in the administrative chain between the reserve organization and the director of the reserve district. It is the commanding officer, an organized reservist, who is "charged with the administration, recruitment, supply, training and mobilization state of readiness," of his command. However, the inspector-instructor, if he uses his talents and those of his staff to further the mission of the reserve unit, will immeasurably assist the commanding officer in bringing his command to the required state of efficiency in the limited time available.

IT TAKES TIME in the reserve; and it takes a good deal of time for the new inspector-instructor to recognize this fact and to reconcile himself to it. Accustomed to obeying orders promptly and to exacting immediate compliance in turn, the regular officer on duty with reserves soon finds himself knee-deep in frustration. Directives from higher headquarters pile high on his desk. To remedy this, he may be tempted to take action for his absent opposite number, usurping the latter's command prerogatives. His impatience may be heightened by the casual attitude with which many reserves consider the administrative requirements. This may lead him to criticize roundly the reserves in general and to build up a feeling of antipathy toward their immediate representative, the unit commander.

Of course, such impatience on the part of the inspector-instructor provokes intransigence on the part of the commanding officer. Lack of consideration breeds obstinacy and soon both parties become adamant, poles apart, and entirely lacking of a common meeting ground.

Let us place ourselves in the position of an inspector-instructor faced with such a stalemate, realizing that it

is conducive neither to the efficiency of the unit nor to peace of mind. Could it be that we as inspector-instructors have approached our problem lacking understanding and consideration? Could it be that we have been blinded by our own all-embracing connection with the Marine Corps and do not realize that "Citizen-Marines" look to the Corps more as a diversion than as an occupation. As civilians, regardless of our devotion to the Marine Corps, how much time would *we* divert from our jobs and from our families to further the reserve program?

Introspection such as this will properly raise doubts as to the fulfillment of our true mission as inspector-instructors and may instill a desire to seek out ways in which to employ our staffs and to guide ourselves in ameliorating conditions within the unit. At this juncture, we may suddenly be struck with the realization that our reserve unit, having an administrative burden equal to that of its wartime counterpart, is required to drill only two hours a week.

IN FURTHERANCE of a more sympathetic approach toward the problem, we must first obey a basic staff precept and organize our staff to serve the troops best. We already have the services of a regular supply chief to set up property records and to execute the multitudinous supply details. Accountability we should perhaps assume ourselves, or assign to an officer assistant. This is not in accordance with the concept of the independently functioning organized unit, but in the interests of efficiency and security it may be highly desirable. After all, is it reasonable to require a reserve officer, particularly if he is not experienced in supply matters, to accept this grave responsibility when circumstances will require him to be separated from his property and accounts nearly all week? A reserve officer can be appointed as an understudy to learn accountability and to ready himself to assume that function in the event of mobilization.

Administration can be centered about the regular master sergeant or technical sergeant assigned our staff. Perhaps an experienced reservist can be brought on active duty to act as sergeant major or first sergeant for the unit. It may be possible to gather a few organized reserve clerks around this nucleus, who, coached by the S-1 or executive officer, may be able to accomplish much of the unit's administration. It is doubtful if a unit which trains only one night a week, even if its members put in extra time, will ever be able to accomplish all its admin-



Gun crew from Rhode Island's 3d Reserve Bn feeds a shell into breech of one of their 155mm howitzers.

istrative details. However, the unit should be encouraged to assume so much of its own functions as time, interest, and ability will allow, its responsibilities keeping pace with its readiness and willingness to accept them.

The remaining personnel of our inspector-instructor's staff can be used in the upkeep of property and equipment, especially weapons, and in miscellaneous details.

We thus have our staff integrated with the reserve unit and specifically organized to assist it in every way possible, both in performing the actual work and in instructing the organized reservists to eventually assume these duties. We have divided our staff into three task units: supply, administration, and maintenance. They must now be properly indoctrinated as to their duties: They are to assist the unit in every way consistent with the regulations; they are to aid and encourage, not censure and condemn; they are to help, not hinder; they are to realize that the organized reserve unit is their *raison d'être*. Proper attitude is more important than brilliance in an inspector-instructor and his staff.


Having organized our staff to assist the unit in its tasks, we now turn to our own conduct in furtherance of our mission which we now see in the light of cooperation. This is the crux of the problem. Success of a re-

serve organization is directly proportionate to the cooperation between opposite numbers. As careerists, we inspector-instructors may find our functions and ambitions severely limited by the approach of the reserve commander and his officers toward the Marine Corps as an avocation or a hobby. Regardless of the good intentions of the commanding officer, distance or business will very likely preclude his presence at the training center as frequently as desirable. We will thus often find ourselves caught on the horns of a dilemma. Should we accomplish various details that normally fall within the purview of the commanding officer and thereby usurp the latter's prerogatives, or should we stand idly by, waiting for the commander to take action himself? We will find through experience that the answer is a compromise, a balance between complete interference and complete neglect. We cannot dictate actions of the unit commander, but on the other hand we should not knowingly allow him to proceed on a course detrimental to the Marine Corps and thereby harmful to his career.

As inspector-instructors, we must induce—not direct—our opposites into the proper channels. We must examine the conduct and progress of the unit in the light of current directives and instructions. We must keep the commanding officer abreast of the ever-changing administrative situation, submitting to him timely digests of current regulations and recommendations for his action.

If the reserve commander resides at some distance from the training center, it may be necessary for us to travel out to see him occasionally or meet him at a mutually convenient place when business brings him closer aboard. There is a limit to what we can achieve in the office; usually such accomplishments will consist of making up check-off lists of action to be taken. To sit in the office is to add to this list; to get out to see the commanding officer is to subtract from it. We must cooperate in every way with our opposite number, *meet our other half halfway*. It is ideal if a close personal friendship can be developed between inspector-instructor and commanding officer, establishing a firm base for understanding and thereby facilitating the solution of problems which are bound to arise.

Having apprised the commanding officer of the facts, and made recommendations, we must now make every facility of our staff available to implement the decisions which he makes. We can accomplish this by direct action of the staff and by dissemination of information and orders. To encourage use of the training center, it will be well to establish office hours to suit the needs of the members. This will probably entail manning all facilities on Saturdays when most reservists will be able to appear. Also, it may mean having the facilities partially manned at least one night of the week other than drill night for administrative work, officers' and non-commissioned officers' schools, drill practice, etc. Every en-



3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, USMCR, fires a field problem. Training back home pays off on the artillery range near Camp Goettge, one of the camps of the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

courageous should be given those individuals who wish to put in more than the required two hours each week.

It is incumbent upon us to make ourselves available, always within reach. In the reserve program, as in the regular service and in any walk of life, a leader who isolates himself with unapproachability is exposing himself to disaster. It may be necessary for us to wear our rank lightly, at least unobtrusively. This may be tactfully accomplished without the sacrifice of any dignity or respect which our position and affiliation with the Marine Corps calls for. As "Citizens-Marines" judge us not by rank but by ability, so in turn we must apply civilian measures of *their* worth and not antagonize any individual, no matter how ignorant he may be of military procedures, so long as his attitude is sincere.

Before the weekly drill, it is wise to bring the commanding officer up-to-date so that he will be able to make decisions himself and not be required to look toward us for all the answers. An information letter can be drawn up weekly for distribution before drills. This can contain summaries of recent directives from higher headquarters, orders that the commanding officer desires to promulgate, and miscellaneous information of interest to the command. Such a letter must be tactfully worded, the use of the imperative being avoided by the

inspector-instructor, so that the authority of the commanding officer will not be undermined.

It is desirable that the commanding officer have a separate office so that he can conduct his business independently without feeling himself constantly exposed to the critical surveillance of the inspector-instructor. The latter should maintain close liaison without intruding or obstructing. Interference must be avoided; still, it must be evident to all that a meeting of minds exists between these opposite numbers.

By serving anonymously, the inspector-instructor strengthens the foundation upon which the whole structure of the organized reserve (ground) is built, that of command by the local reserve officer, the "Citizen-Marine." Cooperation is the life blood of the organized reserve.

As inspector-instructor, you must induce, not direct; suggest, not order; ameliorate, not aggravate. You will then find ample reward in the realization that you are contributing not only to the establishment of an organization which the regular service will be proud to absorb in time of national emergency, but also to the professional development of officers and non-commissioned officers who can serve as leaders for such a unit in combat.

US MC

Stacking Arms With a T/O Squad

By Maj Leyton M. Rogers

Photos by PFC R. E. Armstrong

Since the adoption by the Marine Corps of the current T/O rifle squad there has existed no satisfactory method, providing both simplicity and uniformity, for that squad to stack arms while equipped as the T/O prescribes. There is in the process of publication a revision of the Landing Force Manual, now to be titled Landing Party Manual, and in this revised edition there is a section devoted to stacking arms. However, this section is written not to guide the T/O squad but rather the drill field squad in which all men are armed with the M1 rifle. FM 22-5, an Army publication used by many units as a drill manual, does not, of course, deal with the Marine T/O squad. In other words, we now have no regulations for stacking arms.

Certainly the Marine Corps should provide a method for troops to accomplish such a fundamental movement as stacking arms rather than placing the responsibility for devising a method upon the small unit commanders of the FMF.

Any proposed way for our T/O squad to stack arms must fulfill certain requirements. Some of these are:

- (1) It must be simple.
- (2) Although designed for the T/O squad it should also be applicable to the drill field squad.
- (3) It must provide for no more than four or five weapons to be placed upon each stack. A greater number than this will preclude breaking down the stacks rapidly and will increase the possibility of weapons being returned to the wrong individuals.

At this point let us regard the arrangement of the men within a T/O squad. The first picture on the opposite page shows such a formation and the weapon with which each man is armed.

Three rifles are required in making a stack and it may readily be seen that at two positions within the squad there are three rifles placed together. Numbers 5 and 9 are the center men of each of these posi-

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tions and could well act as stackmen if we make two stacks for each squad. However, this places more than the wanted number of weapons on each stack. If three stacks are made, each can be composed of the weapons of one fire team, with the carbine of the squad leader as an extra weapon on one stack. This seems to be a satisfactory scheme. But once again we have the difficulty of needing three rifles to make the stacks. With three stacks in the squad we can either interchange the positions of the squad members or we can have them pass weapons toward the stackmen. Certainly passing weapons is simpler than interchanging men and is therefore the more desirable.

With the points previously mentioned in mind, the below outlined system for stacking arms is proposed as one which could be adopted as standard throughout the Marine Corps to relieve small unit commanders of one of the minor headaches now associated with their jobs.

First, there are a number of general rules applicable to both the T/O squad and the drill field squad. They are:


- (1) The squad may stack arms at close interval or at normal interval.
- (2) When the squad is part of a platoon or larger formation, 1. Open Ranks, 2. March, must be given prior to stacking arms.
- (3) Count Off must be given prior to stacking arms. (This command is given after ranks have been opened.)
- (4) Men armed with the M1 Rifle are at the position of order arms and men with other arms have their weapons slung prior to stacking arms.
- (5) The stacks are made by numbers 4, 8, and 12 within each squad.

The various steps required in stacking arms with the T/O squad are shown pictorially on the next three pages. In taking arms, just reverse the process shown.

To adapt this method of stacking arms to the drill field squad no change is necessary. Numbers 4, 8, and 12 still make the stacks. Since the men on the right and left of each stackman are armed with the M1 rifle it is possible to use these weapons, with the rifles of the stackmen, as the bases for the stacks. However, for the sake of uniformity, it is felt that the men should place their weapons on the stack in the same manner as for the T/O squad. Since numbers 3, 7, and 11 have their rifles at the order, they may pass the rifles of 2, 6, and 10 respectively, using the left hand at the balance and securing their own rifles at the order with the right hand.


The establishment of such a means of stacking arms will relieve FMF platoon commanders and squad leaders of the need for improvisation and should clear up some confusion in the minds of troops on this matter.

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The squad (platoon, etc.) may stack arms from either close or normal interval. After ranks are opened and


the squad has counted off, the command 1. Stack, 2. *Arms* is given. Numbers 4, 8, and 12 are stackmen.



At the command *Arms*, each assistant BAR-man (numbers 4, 8, and 12) and each rifleman (numbers 5, 9, and 13) engage and place their rifles as currently prescribed in FM 22-5. This begins the making of the stack.


Simultaneously with the engaging of the first two rifles by the assistant BAR-man and rifleman, each fire team leader (numbers 2, 6, and 10) passes his vertically-held rifle to the BAR-man on his left.






Each BAR-man (numbers 3, 7, and 11) secures his BAR with his right hand, places rifle of man on his right (with his left hand) in position ready to engage stack

formed by two rifles already engaged. The stackman uses left hand to steady partially-formed stack and engages swivel of right rifle to free hook of first rifle stacked.




With the basic stack thus formed, the next step is to add the BAR. Each BAR-man now unslings his weapon,


steadies the piece, and places the BAR on the stack to his left. This done, he resumes position of attention.



Only the squad leader's carbine remains to be added to the first stack in order to complete stacking arms. As soon as the BAR has been placed, the squad



leader unslings his carbine and passes it to his left. It is placed on the stack by the BAR-man. In taking arms, it is only necessary to reverse this whole process.



Pictured above is the T/O squad with its varied arms easily and neatly stacked before it. By using three stacks instead of two, the squad's thirteen weapons

are distributed more evenly, giving the stacks a better appearance. Each stack comprises the weapons of one fire team; only the squad leader's carbine is extra.



SBDs head for Rabaul. The policy since the war has been to use fighter planes for both bombing and fighting. The fighter bombs as accurately as the SBD and can protect itself once rid of bomb load.

A Job for Dive and Torpedo Bomber Pilots

By Capt Robert A. Carr

RECENTLY I HEARD A RESERVE OFFICER REMARK, "I wonder if the Marine Corps has any plans for training Reserve aviators other than fighter bomber and transport pilots. I have tried to join the Organized Reserve squadron, but fighter pilots seem to be preferred. I think I will see what the other services have to offer."

This may strike some as verging on heresy. However it should be pointed out that during World War II aviators were assigned according to the need at that time. Although the majority wished to be in fighters and did try to change to that specialty, very few succeeded. The large percentage that did not change accomplished a difficult task with an underpowered, overloaded, and underarmed SBD (Douglas Dauntless scout bomber) or the SB2C (Curtiss dive bomber), which was worse, because it was difficult to maneuver, too fast in the dive, cursed with a hydraulic system which never seemed to work, and some models kept losing their tail surfaces. The reward for flying these kites appears to be the somewhat dubious privilege of flying trainers on a volunteer basis. These unlucky pilots are, of course, invited to apply for two weeks active duty for training, during which time they are allowed to build up more time in trainers. This is not exactly an opportunity for the Reserve aviator to improve his skill in his chosen field. This present trend of train-

ing has led many officers to believe that they are no longer wanted or needed. Only fighter-bomber pilots are in the Organized Reserve squadrons.

Most officers do not expect the Marine Corps to retain a plane that is passé just to allow some aviators to belong to a Reserve squadron. It is a mission of the Marine Corps to develop and maintain the type of squadrons which are best adapted to carry out the work assigned. The policy since the war has been to use fighter planes for both bombing and fighting. It has been proved that the fighter plane can carry a heavier load, fly further, and bomb just as accurately as the dive bomber. It is also better able to defend itself because as soon as the bombs are released it becomes a fighter. This leaves few arguments for the retention of the dive bomber or the torpedo bomber.

It is further realized that the transition from dive bombing and torpedo bombing to fighter-bomber work takes considerable retraining, is expensive, and time consuming. It may also be considered impractical in many cases because many torpedo and dive bomber pilots would be of little value as fighter pilots, for it is generally conceded that combat flying in fighters is a young man's game. There are exceptions, but as a general rule flyers become too conservative and lose their stamina and



Unemployed dive and torpedo bomber pilots could be trained as helicopter pilots. The use of the helicopter as a ship-to-shore conveyance in amphibious engagements will increase the demand for flyers.

quick reflex action required in fighters as they grow older.

It is interesting to speculate on how the Marine Corps would employ these many aviators in the event of a national emergency. A few could go into transports. I doubt if many could be used because there are already a great many Reserve transport pilots. Some could be assigned to ground jobs and to training cadets, but there would still be many who would be difficult to usefully place.

I propose that the present Reserve training program for aviators be modified. Steps should be taken now to establish an educational program which would prepare these misfits for a valuable role. Millions have been spent to train them to fly. This money should not be wasted.

There may be other programs which merit consideration, but I believe that the use of the helicopter as a ship-to-shore conveyance in amphibious operations is the answer to our problem. This craft, because of its unique ability to rise and descend vertically, is certain to play an important role in future amphibious engagements; consequently the demand for helicopter pilots will be great. The helicopter may not be perfected yet, but its limitations are mainly technical in nature. It is accepted that these shortcomings will be overcome. The principles governing helicopter usage are not awaiting perfection of the craft itself, but are proceeding concurrently with that development. A training program to prepare pilots for the day when they may be used in this capacity should be investigated immediately. Courses could be conducted in amphibious operations and all allied fields. These courses can be given by correspondence to individuals or to groups in VTUs. Confidential material

could be handled by a program patterned after the electronics program.

Reservists could become acquainted with the helicopter during the two weeks active duty for training period by sending part of the present squadron to the West Coast or by forming a new squadron at El Toro. The helicopters could be stationed at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune during the summer months. There the neglected pilots could check out in the craft as well as study and observe amphibious warfare. As helicopters become more plentiful they can be made available to Reserves by assigning several to each Marine air detachment at the naval air stations for reserve flight training.

By adopting such a program the following could be accomplished:

1. A monetary saving would be realized because these aviators, already competent pilots, would need little retraining to qualify as helicopter pilots.
2. A manpower saving would be accomplished by utilizing large numbers of these former bomber and torpedo pilots, whose specialties are no longer needed, in helicopters.
3. A pool of trained pilots would be available to provide a nucleus for rapid expansion in case of a national emergency.
4. Add stimulus to the Reserve aviation program by affording Reserve officers the opportunity to participate in an interesting and worthwhile phase of amphibious warfare.

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Capt Carr is attached to Headquarters, 13th Marine Corps Reserve District, Seattle, Washington. This is his first article for the GAZETTE.

The Effective Officer


By Capt Leo W. Jenkins



• MARINE CORPS OFFICERS, like lawyers, doctors, teachers and other types of professional people, come in many diverse types. A search for the truly effective variety frequently reveals those who are in various degrees removed from the effective and, in some instances, approaching the defective. Of the many types of officers the following are perhaps most representative of the entire group.

1. **The dictator** is somewhat of a sadist who knows all the answers. Enlisted men if he is a junior officer and enlisted men and all junior officers if he is a senior officer exist for his enjoyment. A loud mouth is used to cover up mistakes and ignorance. His actions are justified in his eyes on reference to traditions or the "old Marine Corps" of which he was not a significant contributor. The enlisted men quite naturally detest this type of officer while his fellow officers, although tolerating recitations of his recent and past exhibitions of meanness, seldom seek his company on liberty.

2. **The delegator** is a nice fellow but quite lazy. Occasionally, he is obliged to resort to bribery while delegating. He'd like to complete this report or make this inspection but he is needed elsewhere; i.e., the sack is calling him. Enlisted men know that they are relatively safe with the delegator for he will never volunteer for any assignment that might involve work. He is not too exacting in his demands as long as his work is done by others to a satisfactory degree. In extreme cases when he is about to be trapped into some work he will not hesitate to check into sick bay. The delegator is a student of organization and procedure for this enables him to anticipate future work and thus be prepared with a method for having it done. On the whole, he is a likable fellow, but one to be avoided in time of war.



3. **The griper**—Rare indeed is the man in any profession who does not find reason to gripe occasionally. In fact, health counselors advise us that some griping is good for the soul. The griper overdoes it without being concerned about his soul. He just loves to gripe. He seldom recognizes efficiency or ability in others. No one has it quite as difficult as he does. Everyone with an assignment better than his got it through pull or Marine Corps inefficiency. Headquarters spends most of its time plotting mean situations for him. One of these days he is going to punish the Corps and quit.

4. **The stopgapper** is just biding his time in the corps. He has a mighty powerful friend in the eighth ward who will take care of him whenever he cares to make the move. He also met a big contractor at a bar in San Francisco a couple of years ago who promised him a job for 20 thousand a year as a starter. He may not take that deal because he expects something bigger to break. At any rate the Marine Corps is not the career for him. Perhaps he is right. The genuine stopgapper is generally an efficient officer because he is anxious to protect his reputation. The sooner he moves on the better for all concerned and particularly for the officer himself because it is quite difficult to prepare for advancement in two careers at the same time.



5. **The buddy** is a cause for embarrassment to enlisted men and annoyance to his fellow officers. Enlisted men are not comfortable in his presence, and most officers are well aware of his tactics. His actions generally injure inexperienced enlisted men who gain a false conception of military relationships by considering this officer as typical. Periodically when lack of genuine respect becomes obvious, this chameleone-like officer becomes quite tough and reveals that it doesn't pay to be nice. "People only take advantage of you" becomes his theme song.

6. **The politician** tries hard to be at the right place, near the right person, at the right time, at all times. He is an interesting character because he generally knows a lot of service gossip. Human nature being what it is he spends much time cultivating the right people and studying service policy and anticipating developments. He is fast to see the significance of otherwise innocent directives. Again he is a likeable officer but tough on morale. His chief value in so far as his fellow officers are concerned is in the personal G-2 department for he generally gets the "scoop" a few days before anyone else and shares it freely.



7. **The overrated** appears among all ranks. He is the second lieutenant, captain, or colonel who has too much authority by virtue of his rank for the ability with which he was endowed by God. He frequently is either very loud in order to cover up his shortcomings or very modest and likeable to avoid criticism for his inefficiency. He attained his position by staying out of trouble and avoiding situations wherein his true ability might be tested. This officer deserves sympathy for his life is not a happy one. More often than is realized he sweats out a crisis only to face another one. If it were not for embarrassment and pride, he would ask for a demotion or leave the Corps for some enjoyable pursuit. Like the others he is too deeply involved to do either so he will remain with us.

8. **The social lion** represents the Corps in a decorative capacity. He can "bring up the rear" at any cocktail party, tea, or reception. He is a good officer generally, providing official duties do not interfere with his extra-curricular activities. It is not wise to strike up too close a friendship with this fellow for he frequently requests others to do his work so he can be free for one of his numerous engagements. Civilians or members of the other branches of the service usually become bored when he begins to recite the glories of the Corps with a generous display of alleged or imaginary personal heroism.



9. **The effective officer** possesses, in varying degrees, elements of all the other types but not enough of any one to be so classified. He has all the qualities and characteristics of a military leader. He is sensitive of his weaknesses and constantly strives to overcome them. In addition to those characteristics of military leadership that are described in military manuals such as intelligence, proper attitude, ability to lead troops, capacity to assume responsibility, and appreciation of command relations, he also may be distinguished by the following characteristics:

- a. He is considerate of other peoples' feelings, particularly of the men under his command. He realizes that personal problems often cause men to react in ways removed from their true character and is, therefore, always ready to investigate before reprimanding.
- b. He displays good manners and refinement not only at the right time and place but at all times and places.
- c. He can speak to any audience in a manner that brings credit to himself and the Corps.
- d. His deportment is such that he is just as much at ease in a drawing room as he is in the field.
- e. He is not profane merely to make an impression but reserves his profanity for those rare occasions when it might do some good.

- f. He believes in God and public worship and is not ashamed of professing the fact through deeds and words.
- g. He is cooperative at all times even when such co-operation is not expected in line of duty.
- h. He believes in good sportsmanship and practices it.
- i. He is physically clean.
- j. He does not use the mistakes of others to justify his own errors.

The effective officer is not difficult to find. He exists on every post, comes from varying backgrounds and may well be likened to our good leaders in industry, commerce, the professions and government—just a decent American anxious to do his best for a cause in which he believes.

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Battle Sounds

By LtCol Wade M. Jackson

Do you remember this?

YOUR BATTALION IS OCCUPYING A QUIET SECTOR OF the front lines. From your position at the battalion CP you suddenly hear indistinct firing from the vicinity of one of the outposts. Several questions immediately confront you. Is the firing in our sector? Do the adjacent units have patrols out in front? Has our outpost fired on an enemy patrol? Are we being attacked? Perhaps you wait for the company commander from whose sector the firing appeared to come to make a report, and then after a reasonable time, you get him on the phone. He denies that anything is happening in his sector. Yes, he heard some firing and is making a check on it but he is sure his company isn't involved. Then you get a call from regiment, "What's going on up there?" You reply: "It sounds like some firing out to our front. I'm checking on it right now and I'll let you know as soon as we find out anything." You get your other company commanders on the telephone and they positively affirm that everything is quiet in their sectors. You inquire of a nearby staff officer: "Didn't you hear that shooting?" He replies, "Yes sir, I heard it, it was probably some of those trigger-happy replacements." Then you tell the executive officer to get the company commanders on the phone and give them a growl about all of this promiscuous firing. You call Regiment to make your negative report. Just before you hang up the regimental commander comments, "Damn peculiar, shooting going on all over the place and nobody knows anything."

Perhaps this happened to you.

Your unit is moving through jungle in a deployed formation. The advance is held up and you hear the word being passed, "Snipers in the trees up ahead." Well, you keep your company moving but you hold your carbine at the ready and try to conceal your own nervousness because everyone knows that snipers try to pick out

officers. Then it happens. You dive for cover as you hear a "crack" from that big tree just to your left front. Someone says, "There he is!" You strain your eyes watching for the body to fall to the ground while two or three men riddle that tree with bullets. Nothing falls and you still can't see anything in the tree. After you get the men moving again you surmise that if there was a sniper he must be dead now, that he was probably tied in the tree and therefore couldn't fall. Later, when you report to the battalion commander, you can see that your story doesn't sound as plausible as you would like it to.

Does this sound familiar?

Artillery shell explosions are heard in the vicinity of the front lines. Is it enemy fire? Where are those shells dropping? If it is in our sector, do we have any casualties? Is the adjacent battalion using their mortars and if so what are they shooting at? What type of shells caused the sounds you just heard? Then the reports start coming in. Front line troops of one company say the enemy is dropping shells on their position. Another company says our own artillery is registering their guns in front of battalion. An observer from your battalion mortar platoon says that it is the 81mm mortars of the adjacent battalion and still another source reports that it was a barrage of knee mortar shells from a Japanese combat patrol. So the story goes. A series of confusing and erroneous reports come in while your liaison officer is checking with the artillery and someone else is calling the adjacent battalion. Then the inevitable call from a higher echelon wanting information you can't give. "Where is that artillery fire in your sector? What is it? Where is it coming from? Are you sure it isn't your own mortars? Can you estimate the enemy firing position? Do you have any casualties?" You reply that you are checking on it and will let them know when you have some definite information. Of course you never get any definite information because the more you check the greater variety of answers you receive. Again, there is the usual growl from the next echelon about no one ever knowing what goes on in your battalion.

LtCol Jackson, a 3d Marine Division veteran, is a member of the Advisory Board and Tactical Inspectors Section, Special Training Regiment, MCS, Quantico.

Why can't we give all personnel a training course where actual high explosives are electrically detonated at different known distances away? In combat it would be valuable for a man to know whether an explosion was caused by an 81 or 105mm

The indistinct firing cited in the first case could be explained as the "cracks" of low velocity bullets passing overhead. The "crack" of the sniper's rifle was probably the sound caused by a high velocity bullet passing just over the tree tops. The confusion about the artillery fire is the result of troops going into combat without knowing how to identify the explosions of high explosive shells.

PRIOR TO ACTUAL COMBAT, all personnel should have heard the explosions of mortar and artillery shells. We should emphasize to our marines that they can learn to identify artillery just by using their powers of observation. Why can't we give them a training course where actual high explosive shells are electrically detonated at different known distances away? In combat it would be valuable for a man to know, for example, whether an explosion is caused by an 81mm shell 100 yards away or by a 105mm shell 300 yards away. All we have to do is to put this marine in a trench, give him an actual demonstration and he will know this difference for the remainder of his career in the service. When it is considered that you can put a hundred recruits in trenches for the same demonstration, it certainly makes the expenditure of artillery shells for this training purpose seem worth while.

In our present training programs every marine has an opportunity to listen to the firing sounds of many different weapons. Why not train him to listen to these sounds so that he will know, for example, whether he is listening to a BAR or a LMG? Also in case of training for combat against a specific enemy, why not give him an opportunity to become familiar with the sound of the enemy's weapons?

Every recruit spends some time in the butts of a rifle range. Most of them believe the "cracks" they hear are caused by the bullets going through the target cloth. Actually there is no perceptible difference in the sound of the "crack" when the bullet hits the bull's eye and when it misses the target altogether. This same recruit would remember that he first hears the "crack" of the bullet going overhead and a short time later the report of the rifle on the firing line. He may remember that there is a greater time interval between the two sounds when the shooters are on the 500-yard line than when they are on the 200-yard line. Why not teach our recruits to interpret this time interval in terms of distance and thereby be able to estimate the range to a weapon which

is firing in their direction? Why not teach them that a high velocity projectile makes a "crack" as it passes through the air so they won't think snipers are shooting at them when what they hear is actually the harmless sound of a bullet passing high over their heads?

The training ideas contained in this article were used by parts of the 3d Marine Division before the Guam operation. They were more fully developed during 1945 at Tent Camp #3 in Camp Pendleton. Such a course of training as outlined below was included in the schedule of approximately 2,000 replacements.

These replacements were trained to identify different types of Marine Corps and Japanese rifle and machine guns by observing characteristic sounds of the guns firing. They were also trained to estimate the distance to the position of these weapons being fired in their direction and to estimate the height of a bullet passing overhead. Different types of high explosive shells were detonated in pits located 300 and 100 yards away to demonstrate that the type of exploding shell could be identified and the distance to the explosion estimated by observing concussion, ground vibration and noise of shrapnel.

Some understanding of the scientific basis of the recommended instruction is necessary. For example, a high velocity projectile moving through the air makes a noise which is determined by the size and shape of the projectile and its speed. When a projectile is moving at a velocity less than the speed of sound what we hear is a "swish" or "sizzling" noise. This noise is caused by air rushing into the partial vacuum in the wake of the bullet. When a projectile is moving along its trajectory path with a velocity greater than the speed of sound what we hear is a "crack." In this case the "swishing" or "sizzling" sound is obscured by the greater volume and intensity of the "crack."

If two projectiles pass closely over your head at the same altitude and you are in both cases facing the gun position the "crack" of a high velocity projectile will seem to come from almost directly overhead and the "crack" of a lower velocity projectile will seem to come from above and to your front. If projectiles of the same velocity are fired over your head from the same position but at different altitudes the "crack" you hear from the closer bullet will seem to come from almost directly overhead while the "crack" of a projectile passing at considerable distance overhead will seem to come from above and to your front.

Sound travels with an approximate speed of 1,080

feet per second. A rifle bullet has an approximate velocity of 2,700 feet per second. This explains why we hear the "crack" of the bullet passing overhead in the butts of a rifle range and then a short time later the noise of the gun back on the 500-yard line. This suggests that by observing the time interval we can estimate the range or distance to the firing position. In the case of automatic weapons this can be done with a high degree of accuracy. With an automatic weapon firing overhead you hear first a series of "cracks" followed by a mixture of "cracks" and gun reports and last a series of gun reports. By counting either the number of "cracks" before the first gun report or the number of gun reports after the last "crack" we obtain a time interval figure which can be readily and accurately interpreted in terms of distance.

When an artillery shell explodes an observer can estimate the distance away and the type of shell by analyzing the total effect of this explosion. This total effect consists of vibration which is transmitted through the ground, noise and concussion which travels through the air, and the sound of flying shell fragments. It is difficult to explain the total effect of a 60mm shell exploding 100 yards away and in turn to contrast this with the total effect of an 81mm shell exploding 200 yards away. However, experience has shown that a demonstration will serve to impress this difference on the average marine.

Here is an outline of a course of instruction which would help marines identify and locate weapons that are firing at them:

A. An indoctrination lecture with suitable charts to explain scientific background. This lecture includes a historical example of how a Marine officer and two enlisted men used this observation technique to knock out several Japanese machine gun positions and explains hypothetical situations in combat when the ability to interpret what one hears will be valuable.


B. A written examination to test the students' ability to identify various types of weapons by sound of firing. This examination is prior to instruction.

C. A demonstration of different types of weapons firing with the instructor pointing out characteristic difference in sound. In this demonstration all weapons are fired in the immediate area of the classroom and again at a distance of 100 yards.

D. Another written examination to test learning progress.

E. The instructional group is assembled in trenches and the same weapons are fired overhead from ranges of 100, 200, and 300 yards. The students are given a written examination on their ability to estimate both range and type of weapon without additional instruction.

F. All weapons are fired with the instructor pointing out characteristic sounds and time intervals. In this phase, each weapon should be fired successively from 100, 200, and 300 yards to emphasize different time inter-



vals between the "crack" and the report of the gun. Next, all weapons are fired at the 100-, 200-, and 300-yard ranges to emphasize contrasts in sounds of reports, and finally each weapon is again fired successively from the different ranges.

G. A written examination requiring each student to estimate range and identify type of weapon when they are fired at random.

H. A demonstration of automatic and semi-automatic weapons firing at different altitudes overhead and to both flanks.

I. A demonstration accompanied by an examination of 60mm, 81mm, 75mm, and 105mm shells being electrically detonated in explosion pits located 100 and 300 yards away.


J. A demonstration accompanied by instruction to point out characteristic total effects.

K. An examination with the different type shells being exploded at random from 100 and 300 yards.

In practice, the grades after instruction invariably show significant progress over scores made before instruction. On two occasions instructional groups were given all preliminary examinations without usual accompanying instruction and examinations. On the basis of 100 as a perfect score these groups averaged less than 10. These same groups were then put through the regular instruction course and it was found that their average on subsequent examinations was better than 80.

Figure 1 shows a plan for a "battle sounds" course. Space and materials for such a course should be readily available at any post where numbers of men are trained. Such a course, if properly conducted, would take the place of many days of actual combat in the battle-hardening process of our training.

USMC



How Would You Do It?

By MSgt F. T. Stolley

WHILE ON RECRUITING DUTY IN A MIDWESTERN CITY I was detailed to report to the chairman of a committee one Decoration Day to take part in the unveiling ceremonies for a memorial to the city's war dead.

Upon reporting I found that I was to have charge of 30 men of the various branches of the Armed Forces and had 15 minutes to survey the situation and instruct the men.

The problem posed was this: the memorial was a granite "L" shaped structure about 150 feet long. It was in the shape of a wall with the "L" enclosing a plaza. Along the side of the wall were thirty bronze plaques inscribed with the names of the war dead.

Each plaque had an individual curtain veiling it operated by a draw string. Gen Wainwright was to speak at the ceremony and at the completion of his speech, was to escort the mother of the first man killed in action down to the first plaque. As she pulled the draw string unveiling the tablet all the other plaques were to be unveiled simultaneously.

The problem was complicated further by a white canvas carpet running parallel to the wall. After the unveiling the General and the mother were to walk down this carpet and inspect each plaque. In the interim, no one was to walk on the carpet.

It was necessary for me to move the men into position marching them *outside* of the carpet, get them moved over the carpet next to the plaque they were detailed to unveil, move them back over the carpet after the unveiling, and then move them off the plaza. All this was to be

done by military commands.

I searched my memory for a precedent which would prescribe movements for the ceremony but could remember none . . . how would you do it?

How I Did It

After a hasty glance at the layout I returned and instructed the men. I gave each man a specific plaque to unveil and then lined them up in a column of threes at normal interval.

I marched them up to the head of the stairway leading to the plaza and gave them "Column of files to the left."

As the first man of the single file came just past the outside of the canvas carpet I gave "Column left," and marched the file around the inside of the "L" until each man was abreast of a plaque. Then I halted them, faced them inboard, and gave them parade rest until the General finished his speech.


After the speech I called them to attention and gave the command, "Post." At the command the men did an about face, stepped over the carpet, and took their post next to their plaque and grasped the draw strings.

As the woman, who was to unveil the first plaque, took the draw string and started to unveil the tablet I gave the command "Two," and all the plaques were unveiled simultaneously.

After the unveiling I again gave the command "Post," which moved the men back to their original positions. I then faced them left, reformed them in a column, and marched them off.

US MC

The GAZETTE will pay \$25.00 for similar service-connected problems and their solution.



The deck court officer, trying a not guilty case, becomes a legal schizophrenic. He acts as prosecutor, defense counsel, judge, and jury. The accused feels that justice is blind.

Legal Insanity

By Maj John P. Wilbern

"JOHN DOE, PRIVATE, U. S. MARINE CORPS, YOU have heard the specification preferred against you; how say you to it, guilty or not guilty?"

"Not guilty."

And so, two fateful, all important words, are the formal starting point of a tremendous struggle of a man with himself, for the accused has pleaded not guilty in a Deck Court Martial and the burden of being both the judge (Deck Court Officer) and the prosecution (still, the Deck Court Officer) has been cast upon the shoulders and the conscience of the poor unfortunate who has been fingered by the Colonel for the trial at hand. I say the "formal" starting point of the struggle, to dif-

ferentiate the fears and the doubts which assail any officer who prior to this case has tried just one not guilty Deck Court case (and who has entertained thoughts of ill foreboding ever since he heard a rumor that the accused in the instant case might plead not guilty) from the pall of gloom which inevitably settles over the usual, average, conscientious Deck Court Officer when that apparently innocuous "not guilty" forces him to become a legal schizophrenic.

A legal schizophrenic? What's that?

Schizophrenia is a mental complex, a state of mind in which an individual lapses from reality and from his normal personality into another mental circumstance

Can we dispense with the purely theoretical mental superman who is supposed to become a split personality, a schizophrenic, a legal dual personality capable of complete inhuman objective impartiality? The author says we can

in which he is a totally different person with (to himself) a different personal identity and, on occasion, a different way of life. He is a "split personality," one moment himself, and the next a different creature, frequently ludicrously exaggerated; the stock case of the scrub woman who on occasion acts, talks, and thoroughly believes that she is Queen Marie of Roumania, and cannot be dissuaded therefrom is a common illustration. I maintain that the Deck Court Officer is forced to become a schizophrenic by those two words: "Not guilty."

How?

When they are pronounced, the Deck Court Officer, by basic edict of the 64th article of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, as expanded and implemented by sections 690 to 704 of Naval Courts and Boards, is required to assume a dual, a split personality, a dual *legal* personality: he must, as the Deck Court Officer, hear the evidence as presented to himself by witnesses for the accused and by prosecution. By the prosecution? Yes; but who is the prosecution? That's right: the Deck Court Officer.

So, the prosecution (the Deck Court Officer) must convince the Court (the same, good old Deck Court Officer) that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If this is not legal schizophrenia, by edict of law, I can't think of another term. But, let's see how it works out.

RECOVERING FROM THE SHOCK, of the "not guilty" plea, the Deck Court Officer rises to his feet, and assuming the spiritual array of the prosecution, goes about the business of convincing himself that the accused is indeed guilty of the offense alleged in the specification. To date, the most successful method I have been able to develop in keeping the identities of myself as the Court and myself as the prosecution separate and distinct is to sit down behind my desk when I am the Court and from that more comfortable position (both morally and anatomically) listen to the evidence being produced by the defense or to the cross-examination of one of my (the prosecution's) witnesses, on the one hand, and on the other, to arise to my feet and walk around in front of my desk when questioning one of my (the prosecution's) witnesses, or when cross-examining one of the witnesses for the defense. If this facade of the split legal personality were carried to its logical extension, I would ask the question of the witness at bar, and then require said witness to defer his answer until I could

whip around and sit down to hear the testimony, then bounce back to my role as the prosecution etc., etc., but since these physical gymnastics would prove as tiring to my bodily structure as my split personality role and its concomitant mental gymnastics prove to my cranial contents, I have long since discarded this practice, this physical manifestation of the distinction between judge and prosecution. No, I now sit down only when the defense is active; when prosecuting, or rather when waging justice, I merely trust that the accused can visualize (as frequently I cannot) that half of my legal being which is labeled by edict of law "The Court" is sitting in the empty chair behind the desk, empty physically but theoretically containing at least 50 per cent of my moral sensibility. Surely the accused (if he has kept correct count and has actually observed and understands the facade I have attempted to erect) can see that when I am standing in front of the desk, I am the D.A., out after his hide, but *legally*; and equally surely, the accused can see the benign expression of Justice reposing on my face as I sit behind the desk and suavely, but justly, overrule the motions of the accused for dismissal of the case, or object (as the prosecution; sometimes I even rise to my feet for this action) to leading questions by the accused; always I try to rise to my feet and walk around the desk to resume the role of the D. A., but sometimes, I forget, and then the legal fiction of legal schizophrenic fission breaks down, and I am disclosed: I am one person, no matter what that article of the AGN or those sections of NCB say I must be, disclosed as a human being, as primarily the prosecutor, the D. A., the guy who loves to win, hates to lose, even a Deck Court Martial. I am the prosecutor, trying the case, and with the will to win natural to any human being, listening more to my own reasons for conviction of the accused than I am the judge, sitting back weighing impartially my arguments presented to me which fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the man at trial. Ludicrous? Fantastic? No, just a mistake, in assuming that a man out to win, without detriment or injury to the legal rights of the accused, can listen to his own case and still be an impartial judge. I don't think a Marshall, a Taney, an Oliver Wendell Holmes, eminent jurists all, could do it.

The inconsistencies, the pressures, the impossibilities, the more ludicrous aspects of the not guilty Deck Court could be carried on ad infinitum. Let's leave this approach and consider a few of the more serious sides of the problem, for I consider it such. For one thing,

we have no counterpart of this legal technique anywhere in the American civil or criminal legal framework upon which our naval legal system is based. True, we have small claims courts, justice of the peace courts, county and district courts wherein the judge may be both that and the jury, and wherein he may ask questions relative to the clarification of facts in the instant case, but none to my knowledge in which any judge tries to prosecute the case and to convince himself that his method of prosecution has been successful beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, in most instances of trial by judge alone, these men are jurists, graduates of law schools, and courses of jurisprudence, trained in legal philosophy and processes. Still, even these men are not required by American law to fulfill the impossible moral requirements of dispensing justice impartially after being both the prosecutor and the judge, a burden which is cast upon the Deck Court Officer in a not guilty case. These judges in civilian life are required to distinguish between fact and law in hearing a case, but in no instance must they judge and prosecute simultaneously. Is the average officer of the Naval Service, lacking this background of legal training and years of experience in the field of legal jurisprudence, more qualified than a full-fledged jurist?

• ANOTHER POINT for consideration: the not guilty Deck Court Martial can very easily result in the dispensation of a large amount of injustice to at least two of the three parties to the trial. First the accused: I doubt if most men found guilty at Deck Court really believe that the mechanics of the trial (as distinguished from the possible sentence) provide justice, for I doubt if even the accused, perhaps despite his inner knowledge of self-guilt as might be the case, really believes that the prosecutor has had a tough time convincing the prosecutor, acting as the court, of the guilt of the second. Second, the Deck Court Officer: the normally serious, conscientious Deck Court Officer, assaying the trial in retrospect, may have serious doubts as to the result of the trial, be it conviction or acquittal, for I sincerely believe that in the intentness of the motivation to win (and the Deck Court Officer, as a prosecutor, is only human) the line of impartiality of the court may well, though however unintentionally, be obscured. I consider it an injustice to the Deck Court Officer, despite his perhaps unusual ability to be impartial and despite the likelihood that he may well have a firm foundation or background in moral and more important, legal concepts, to require him to prosecute and judge with only one intellect, indivisible despite the edict of the AGN and NCB. As a much lesser consideration, let's not forget the poor recorder who must keep straight in the record who is questioning whom for unless the skipping to and fro around the desk earlier described is strictly adhered

to by the prosecutor and carefully noted by the recorder the record may well become confused and indicate by mistaken entries that the Court has originated evidence, or some such other malpractice which would clearly violate the spirit and intent of the framework of the Naval legal system, when actually, it might well not have been the Court at all but rather the same person acting in his other capacity, that of the prosecutor, quite properly originating the evidence and the recorder had merely failed to take accurate enough note of his exact location (to wit, he was standing in front of the desk that time, and hence, was actually the prosecutor). The third party to the trial, the Naval Service, may derive benefit from the trial in that the ends of naval law may have been served, but I frankly believe that the possibility of the above listed injustice, which may well be incurred, in most instances more than counterbalances the "Justice" which may possibly accrue to the Service.

• How to CORRECT this unfortunate circumstance? Far be it from me to play American Bar Association, but I can suggest a couple of variations. First, when a man pleads not guilty, immediately require the Convening Authority to appoint a Trial Judge Advocate who would actually try the case at bar. By all means, retain the provisions as to testimony being taken in an informal manner, as to only the pertinent points of a witness' testimony going into the record presented to the Convening Authority for his review of the Court's action, and all other provisions which make the Deck Court a swift way of dispensing justice. But destroy the fallacious concept, the strictly philosophical phantasy that a man can simultaneously be both judge and prosecution and still be impartial. If the accused pleads guilty, still charge the Court with protecting the man's best interests, and yet, require the Court to judge only on admitted fact in relationship to the moral debt to the Naval Service that the man has incurred by committing the offense to which he has pleaded guilty. Let the Deck Court Officer act as a true judge in awarding the sentence, subject of course to the review of the C. A.

Another variation would be to eliminate the Deck Court Martial altogether, and to place in the hands of the commanding officer a higher scale of punishments which he would be empowered to award according to a pre-defined category of offenses, or according to a declared policy of the Navy Department, in relationship to these more serious offenses. This second suggestion I consider less feasible due to the difficulty of definition of and distinction between offenses of a more and a less serious nature. But, whatever the change may be, let us dispense with the purely theoretical mental superman who is supposed to become a sane split personality, a schizophrenic, a legal dual personality capable of complete, inhuman objective impartiality.

US MC



Army 4.2-inch mortar. This weapon can reach into defiladed approaches and packs more high explosive than 105mm.

MORTARS & SMOKE

There is agreement that the initial stages of the amphibious operation, during which the assault troops are seizing a foothold and prior to the arrival of the organic artillery ashore, is the critical point in the operation; and that it is at that time that the situation hangs in the balance while the infantry are on their own with only the supporting fires given by their own mortars, naval gunfire, and air strikes. Tarawa, the Marshalls, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Omaha Beach showed us that beach defenses, well prepared and defended by a stubborn enemy, are not reduced by pre-landing air and naval gunfire preparations; no matter how much metal is dropped on or fired at the defenses, the assaulting infantry must still fight its way through with grenades,

By LtCol Henry Aplington, II



The 4.2-inch mortar weighs less than 75mm pack howitzer and can be carried ashore with infantry.

demolitions, and its own hand and crew served weapons. It is in this initial stage that the anomaly to which Maj Rouse referred in his article *Amphibious Assault Artillery* arises; artillery cannot land and go into position until the infantry has cleared sufficient position areas for the guns, and infantry needs the guns to assist it in clearing the position areas. Something in addition to NGF and air is needed to furnish artillery support ashore in this touch and go period; there is likewise agreement on this point.

THE DIRECT FIRE required for fortification breaching will, in the early stages of future operations, probably be furnished by medium caliber recoilless weapons, the 75-mm and 105mm which made their appearance on Okinawa and with which the infantry divisions of the Army now in Germany are armed. These weapons will handle the short range direct fire, possibly with armor piercing projectiles, possibly with something better to be developed. Hand carried, these recoilless weapons are very transportable and hard to knock out. They have, however, the shortcoming common to all flat trajectory artillery in a shallow beachhead; the awkward gap which exists between the minimum range for indirect fire and direct fire. Something additional is needed.

In this close fighting, we require an artillery weapon with the following characteristics:

- (1) A high degree of mobility enabling it to land with the infantry.
- (2) A low silhouette to reduce its vulnerability to enemy fire once emplaced ashore.
- (3) High trajectory combining short minimum range with adequate long range; the minimum range for normal close support, long range for deep fires, and the high angle fire to reach out of any beachhead and into defilade to stop the movement of enemy reserves.

(4) Fire power and punch equal to or better than organic medium artillery.

A number of solutions to this dilemma have been proposed in the pages of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. It has been suggested that we develop floating gun platforms to serve as position areas until the artillery can get ashore, that we *develop* rockets or mortars as primary amphibious artillery types, that we utilize armored vehicles, possibly amphibious, for mobile FDCs and batteries, and that we go back to the 75mm pack howitzer for the early stages of the operation. Let's look at these proposals in detail.

THE FLOATING PLATFORMS WOULD, under open sea conditions, require the fire control equipment of a naval vessel, quite superfluous once the guns were ashore. I know that, without it, I would not want close artillery support from a battery firing from a pitching platform. The armored vehicles and the armored mobile FDCs present the two problems of that awkward minimum range and high vulnerability to modern tank destroying weapons such as we did not meet in the Pacific in the last war. It should be noted in this respect that the armored divisions of the United States Army provide a total of 39 tank recovery vehicles for a total T/E allowance of 272 light and medium tanks, roughly one recovery vehicle for each seven tanks. The 75mm pack howitzer has good mobility and can be man-carried and it has a low silhouette, but no important land fighting force has relied on its small caliber as a major weapon since 1939 when the 105mm began to supersede it. 75mmms are simply too light. That leaves, so far, the solution of developing rockets or mortars.

Develop is the wrong word for in the mortar field the 4.2" chemical mortar has been successfully used in two wars; it was introduced in the First World War and gained popularity and acceptance in the Second. In its present form it embodies those requirements for assault artillery presented above. A mortar, and less than one quarter the weight of the 75mm pack howitzer, it can be hand carried ashore with the infantry. Its minimum range is about 700 yards making it very acceptable as artillery in shallow beachheads while its maximum range of 4,400 yards fits it to handle any mission considered too close for flat trajectory naval gunfire or the frequently erratic air strike. It can reach into defiladed approaches and its projectile carries a greater weight of high explosives than even the 105mm. The 4.2 is a truly versatile weapon. Rifled, it packs artillery accuracy and fire power with the mobility of the 81mm mortar. It can take advantage of small depressions or low walls to reduce its vulnerability; at times in the last war it was even fired from landing craft. It breaks down for carrying into three component parts each of which can be packed by hand or carried on a hand cart. It takes ter-

TABLE I

Weapon	Wt lbs	Max Rng yds	MaxRate /min	Sustained Rate /min	WtHE Filler lbs	Bursting Radius	WtRd Packed lbs	WtWP Packed lbs	Rds/100yd/min to screen Flank 6 o'clock
60mmMtr	42	1985	35	18	1/3	17	4.5	XX	XX
81mmMtr	136	3290	35	18	4.5	25	19.0	4.1	0.8
4.2" Mtr	294	4400	20	5	6.8	30	32.5	6.8	0.4
75mmPH	1392	9610	6	3	1.4	30 X 10	25.0	1.3	3.0
105mmHow	4900	12205	4	2	3.9	50 X 15	49.0	4.0	1.5

rain which will stop a man to stop it. I watched a battalion of them come ashore on Arundel Island in the New Georgia group and start off through the jungle for the northern end of the island from which, a few days later, they were firing on Japanese positions on Kolombangara, supplementing the fire of Marine 155mm guns emplaced at Piru plantation.

The heaviest part of the 4.2 is the base plate which weighs 150 pounds; the short rifled barrel weighs 91 pounds, and the monopod or standard weighs 53. This weapon is heavy in comparison with the 136 pounds of the 81mm mortar but extremely light and transportable in terms of our present divisional artillery or self-propelled full tracks. The assembled weapon weighing 294 pounds can be emplaced in five minutes by day and ten by night. Its major draw-back as an infantry weapon in its present form is the heavy base plate which could

conceivably be modified into a two piece, locking load. Table I compares the 4.2 with the weapons with which we are familiar in the Marine Corps.

The 4.2 is fully capable of firing normal artillery missions in support of infantry and is used for that purpose by the Army infantry. Originally designed in World War I to establish and maintain smoke screens, the Second War found it given a high explosive role and placed in direct support of infantry where it proved so effective that it was adopted as an infantry weapon. In the Army infantry regiment it supplements the M3 105-mm howitzer, the low silhouette, 2703 pound weapon organic to the cannon company. The case for the 4.2 as an infantry supporting weapon can best be made by quoting an authority on the subject. LtCol Kenneth A. Cunnin, Chemical Corps, USA, states in a recent issue of MILITARY REVIEW, the Command and General Staff

The battalion commander's best friends are his own 81mm mortars when he wants smoke. 81s relieve him of dependence upon artillery which may be busy with a priority mission when needed most.



College's thought provoking, pocket sized magazine*, "What brought about the adoption of the 4.2 in the infantry regiment? It is felt that this resulted from the fact that the infantry had found that they needed a heavy weapon in the cannon company *of greater all around usefulness* [the italics are this author's] than the M3 howitzer. From the standpoint of versatility, the heavy mortar fitted in best. In addition, the infantry had learned the tremendous effectiveness of screening smoke when properly laid down by a unit equipped with the right weapon and an efficient and effective shell.

"Another consideration, it is felt, was the desire of the infantry to have a weapon in the cannon company which could go with them wherever they might be called. Wherever human feet and hands can walk and climb with carried loads, there the 4.2 mortar can likewise be found."

• **EQUALLY** as important as developing a weapon adapted to the assault role is the continuing search for a method of reducing infantry casualties, both in the early assault stages of an operation and throughout its duration. A discussion of smoke leads directly out of any consideration of the chemical mortar.

To quote Col Cunnin again, "We are convinced that many hard won successes would have been much less costly if more frequent and efficient screening had been employed. . . . With proper weather conditions and all factors being equal, the attack of any type of position without maximum judicious use of smoke is reprehensible and unpardonable." Some allowance must be made for the natural enthusiasm of the technician for the use of his particular weapon but in the main his remarks are fully justified; any combat leader can probably recall at least one situation in which his reliance upon fire and movement to the exclusion of the artificial concealment of smoke cost lives. As an example, the failure of one battalion to screen during the first two days of the Guam operation contributed to Marine casualties and the slow progress of one flank of the Division beachhead, and permitted Japanese observation over the Division's landing beaches for that critical period. Hindsight is admittedly better than foresight but smoke should have been used; it simply was not considered. This situation was outstanding; Marine officers can undoubtedly think of other examples from this and other operations; from Col Cunnin's remarks it appears that Army officers may well do the same.

What are the facts about smoke? Smoke is a weapon with which every officer is expected to be familiar, it is elementary but its practical application is surprisingly unthought of in the heat of battle. The number one thing,

to be emphasized again, is that smoke is a *weapon* to be used in conjunction with other more obvious weapons. Second, to quote Col Cunnin again, "the judicious use of smoke will reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's aimed fire by one fourth;" this alone is highly desirable. Field firing tests involving smoke will demonstrate that a screened target is confusing but smoke billowing around a firing line is worse, a rifleman enveloped in a drifting cloud of acrid smoke (possibly mixed with HE or tear gas) can only put on his mask, aim in the general direction of the enemy, squeeze his trigger and trust to luck. While smoke shells are bursting there is definite psychological effect to the flying particles of burning WP and as the fire lifts and the assault closes, the sudden appearance of hostile riflemen from out of the screen tends to cause confusion and the disintegration of the battle position. Smoke reduces the effectiveness of fire from emplaced weapons though not to the same extent as that of rifles and automatic rifles which rely on aimed fire; with screening, the chances of the assaulting infantry passing through the fire lanes of the automatic weapons and the targets of the mortars with fewer casualties are improved, for no machine gunner or mortarman has sufficient ammunition on the position to fire blind continuously into a persistent screen on the chance that the assault has been launched. That smoke is equally detrimental to the aimed fire of the attacker is true, but surprise is with the bayonets of the offensive.

• **THE COMMANDER SHOULD** always consider screening in his estimate of the situation. There are times when it is obviously impractical or unsuitable and others when, even though the target may indicate its use, conditions are not correct. Whether or not it can be used, however, an estimate of the practicability of the use of smoke should be as automatic as that of artillery, mortars, or machine guns. The use of smoke is not simple, winds of less than three miles per hour have barely sufficient velocity to spread it while winds of above 12 or 15 miles per hour tear the screen apart and dissipate it without effectively blinding the enemy. Excessive lack of moisture in the air will reduce the amount of smoke generated and excessive heat or cold will sometimes change the physical state of some agents so that they will not react.** Wind direction and velocity, and the logistics and time element in establishing the screen are vital in the use of smoke and the effective burning time of the agents must be carefully integrated into the tactical plan to insure that the infantry are not suddenly denuded of their concealment half way to the objective. A six o'clock wind will blow the screen off the target to the rear resulting in large expenditure of ammunition and the necessity for infantry closing immediately the fire is lifted.

*MILITARY REVIEW, January, 1949, *The Offensive and Defensive Use of the Chemical Mortar Battalion.*

**Phib-20, MCS, p 11.

A 12 o'clock wind requires nearly as much ammunition expenditure (Table III) and is in addition poor for the assaulting troops; it brings the smoke directly down upon them, blinding them and presenting an inviting target to the enemy as they emerge, coughing or masked, from the haze. But a good gentle (4 to 10 mph) flank breeze facilitates easy establishment and maintenance and drifts the screen down across the front of the enemy position where it can be maintained with minimum expenditure. This condition allows infantry to close undetected and it keeps the enemy in suspense and causes him to waste ammunition. Such a wind strongly indicates screening. In short, smoke can be valuable in the right place. It is not simple to use but battalion commanders are still provided with chemical officers (too often, unfortunately, used simply as 'additional duty officers') to advise them in its use.

The Marine Corps has generally available four methods of smoke projection; if revived as assault artillery, the pack howitzer would be a fifth. At present we have the 81mm mortar, the 105 and 155mm howitzers, and the smoke pot. Table II shows the number of rounds of each, including the 4.2 mortar and the pack howitzer, necessary for simple screening without casualty effect:

Table II

Rds WP/100 yd increment/ min

Double the rounds indicated for the first minute to establish the screen.

Weapon	6 or 12 o'clock	3 or 9 o'clock
75mm PH	6.0	3.0
81mm mtr	1.5	0.8
4.2 mtr	0.7	0.4
105mm how	4.0	1.5
155mm how	1.3	0.5
Smoke pot HC M1	6.0 #	3.0 #

#approximate for approximately 12 minutes burning time.

Smoke characteristics shown in this table (from FM 101-10) hold under average atmospheric conditions for winds of up to three miles per hour; for winds of from three to ten miles per hour an additional factor of 1.5 must be added, and for winds of from ten to fifteen miles per hour, screening is uneconomical. Given a tough nut to crack and a three o'clock flank wind of seven miles per hour, the battalion commander can easily smoke a frontage of 400 yards with his 81mm mortar platoon, certainly sufficient to establish a foothold in the enemy position. And while he is firing for the screen, he can add enough HE to keep heads down.

If it is desired to add the casualty effects of WP to simple screening, a larger expenditure is required:

Table III

Rds WP/100 yd increment/min.

Weapon	6 o'clock	12 o'clock	3 or 9 o'clock
75mm PH	12.0	10.0	4.0
81mm mtr	2.5	2.0	1.0
4.2 mtr	1.25	1.0	0.5
105mm how	9.0	7.0	1.5
155mm how	3.0	2.0	0.5

From a study of these tables it is obvious that, with our present weapons, the battalion commander's best friends are his own 81mm mortars when he wants smoke. 81s relieve him of dependence upon the artillery which may be busy with a priority mission just at the time he wants to jump off or when he wants an additional minute or two of the screen. Adjacent battalion commanders, too, may be very happy to assist in the establishment and maintenance of the screen with their 81s; they may ask the same favor some day or it may help them to get ahead in their own zone. The doctrine which requires lateral lines to adjacent battalions facilitates this exchange of fires. The 81 firing smoke is good but the tables show that it is only half as efficient as the 4.2 which was designed for that purpose.

SMOKE is no idle fancy boosted by a few enthusiastic technicians but can be, and has been, a major factor in the reduction of casualties and the seizure of hostile positions. The Army used smoke in the capture of Munda airfield (smoke, it was reported at Guadalcanal, mixed with HE for very good effect); the crossing of the Rhine in the spring of 1945 was screened by the all-out use of smoke generated not only by shells but by portable smoke generators brought up for the purpose. In this operation, the river and the far bank were well fogged and under this artificial concealment the engineers put down bridges for the troops and armor. In one of the most publicized lucky breaks of the last war, smoke was used to screen the Ludendorf bridge at Remagen (where Marines crossed the Rhine in 1918, it has almost been forgotten) to keep it intact until the engineers could lay down sufficient floating bridges to make that damaged structure unnecessary. Smoke is as practical ashore as it is at sea, it is a weapon and a good one. It is no cure-all for the dangers inherent in the infantry assault but, as Col Cunnin says, "it is a factor to consider."

Our assault doctrine envisions the use of smoke to screen the landing and assist the troops across beachline with reduced casualties; let's project that doctrine ashore and increase the stress on screening to assist the infantry attack. If we do, we want the best possible weapon for the purpose. We want too a weapon which can serve as assault artillery in the initial phases of the assault and can supplement organic Divisional artillery in later. We want a weapon which has proved itself in combat until something demonstratively better comes along: In the 4.2" chemical mortar we have the best smoke weapon yet developed combined with the transportability and low silhouette of the mortar and the fire power of heavy artillery. It solves a vexing problem without reverting to the too light 75mm simply because of its transportability or adopting armor, so highly vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons. It is battle tested; it could solve our problem.

USMC

Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Canadian Army Summary . . .

THE CANADIAN ARMY, 1939-45—Col C. P. Stacey.
354 pages, illustrated, maps, appendices, indexed. Ottawa: King's Printer. \$2.50

For the military reader who desires to familiarize himself with the part played by the Canadian Army in the last war, *The Canadian Army* is an ideal text. For the reader who intends to do further study, it is a good point of departure even though it is not thoroughly documented.

The author had full access to the relevant official documents in the Canadian Department of National Defense, and has written an authentic book. It gives the broad outline of the Canadian Army's problems and activities from 1939 through 1946 in a highly readable and logical form.

The full title is *The Canadian Army, 1939-45—An Official Historical Summary*. In the words of the author, "It is an interim report: a Summary, not a History." However, two operations are discussed in considerable and interesting detail: the experiences of the 1st Infantry Brigade in France in June, 1940, and the Dieppe Raid.

When Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939, the army numbered only 4,500 professional soldiers, and had virtually no motor transport. Exactly three months later, on 10 December 1939, the first convoy of Canadian troops sailed for England. Before the end of the war, Canada had a full field army of two corps, including five divisions and two independent armored brigades in Europe, as well as three divisions remaining in Canada.

Initially the Canadians felt that a draft was unnecessary as well as distasteful. However, a draft act was passed in 1940, and in 1942 provision was made for sending draftees overseas. None were actually sent until 1944.

Although the first contingent sailed shortly after the declaration of war, the Canadians went through a lengthy period of frustration before seeing action. For three and a half years, the army was in a relatively static condition in England. The expedition to France and the Dieppe raid took place during this period, but in the main the Canadians executed unglamorous missions—many of them changed before they could be carried out—which were not conducive to high morale among troops who had hoped to sail immediately to the scene of action.

This situation gave the Canadian army an opportunity

to reach a high level of training which was to prove invaluable. For once in the fighting, the Canadians were kept well-occupied, fighting through the Sicilian, Italian, and Northwest European operations with little rest. They participated in the occupation for a short time after the end of hostilities.

By the time the war was over Canadian Army units had fought in Hong Kong, Sicily, Italy, and Northwest Europe. Canadian Army men had served in Africa, Spitzbergen, Iceland, the Aleutians, the Antilles, and South America. They defended the most likely invasion beaches in England on the eve of the expected attack, and helped to extend the defenses of Gibraltar.

Col Stacey explains that Canadian participation in the Pacific war was limited to a small force helping to defend Hong Kong and another force which participated in the operation against Kiska because by the time the Pacific war broke out, almost all available Canadian troops were committed in the British Isles.

The book is written in British style, with British spelling and British restraint. Occasional instances of unusual individual or unit valor are related, along with vital statistics and brief explanations of strategy. The maps, which fold out so that they may be referred to conveniently without continually turning pages, are very helpful and well done.

Col Stacey is Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff at Army Headquarters, Ottawa, and Official Historian of the Canadian Army for World War II. Before the war, he taught in the Department of History at Princeton and was a member of the Reserve Officers of the Canadian Militia. He went overseas in 1940, at first as Historical Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters, London. During the rest of the war, he supervised the historical program of the Canadian Army overseas. He is the author of *Canada and the British Arms*, *The Military Problems of Canada*, and various articles on military history and affairs.

ARC

Atom Facts Disclosed . . .

MUST WE HIDE?—R. E. Lapp. 182 pages, illustrated. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press. \$3.00

In the past four years eight atomic bombs have been detonated by the United States. During this time the pub-

lic has been deluged with a torrent of printed words purporting to foresee the effects of future atomic attack. Many of these prognostications, offered by a variety of persons, from ex-multi-engine aircraft pilots to writers of "Letters to the Editor," and based on isolated facts, half-truths or rumor, have, by the fallacy of hasty generalization and the process of reasoning from the particular to the general, resulted in a variety of "theories."

The prophets of doom predict the snuffing out of all life on the planet by radiation; the one-weapon enthusiasts foretell the superblitz, a one-day or one-week war, as their predecessors did for aerial bombardment after World War I; and the wishful thinkers believe the atomic bomb to be so terrible that nations will be afraid to go to war, as Hudson Maxim theorized when he invented his machine gun.

This book is different. The author is a pioneer in the atomic bomb project, a participant in the Manhattan Project, and was present as a scientist consultant at both of the Bikini explosions. Dr Lapp has also served as Executive Director of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment. He presents here the actual facts of all the atomic explosions to date, and from them draws logical conclusions, keeping his conclusions to a minimum in the belief "that Americans can be trusted to arrive at the right conclusions when they are armed with facts."

The author assures us that, although all security regulations have been complied with, no significant data has been withheld. Moreover, in presenting these facts concerning the various atomic bomb explosions, the peculiar conditions attending each particular explosion are pointed out in relation to their influence on the results obtained.

The military reader will note that the characteristics and capabilities of the atomic bomb, presented in this book, in no way invalidate the sound principles upon which our doctrine of war is based. Furthermore, that without minimizing the effectiveness of the bomb, its limitations as well as its capabilities are given due consideration.

Viewing the atom bomb from a military point of view, the "one-weapon" theory is completely rejected with a reminder that air power "did not live up to the predictions of its potency" during World War II, and further that: "The only thing wrong with the idea of a super-blitz is that there is no way to wage one."

The author considers that there is "no doubt that the A-bomb is an *effective* weapon, but is not a *decisive* weapon"; that "the atomic bomb is already so powerful that it is big enough for all but a very few targets"; and stressing that, having a definite minimum, "A-bombs are too big for many military applications." It is doubtful if the atomic bomb could be profitably employed against

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troops in the field or ships dispersed at sea; however, supporting installations may be well worth the expenditure of an atomic bomb.

Offensive employment of the atomic bomb poses many problems in delivering the bomb to the target. Active defense against atomic bombs requires an effective warning system, intelligence interception, and the destruction of hostile long range bombers and bomber bases. Passive defense calls for public education to minimize the psychological factor, and dispersion of cities and industrial installations. In atomic warfare, the city of skyscrapers presents an "Achilles heel."

Space precludes a presentation of the data on which the deductions are based, but, in presenting a hypothetical situation of an atomic attack on Manhattan, it is concluded, from the known characteristics of atomic explosions under varied conditions, that aerial delivery would be employed and that an air burst would obtain the most satisfactory results for a hostile power. Considering the effects of an air burst 1000 feet above the intersection of 42nd Street and 5th Avenue; probably, "the heat flash would not be too important," more fires starting from "secondary origin than from direct ignition"; the radiation "would give a lethal dose to a person in the open at a distance of slightly less than one mile." The blast would effect demolition up to 1500 feet, severe damage up to 4500 feet. "Directly under the center of the blast, people in subways would be unaffected either by the blast or by radiation. They would be perfectly safe. People farther from the center of the blast would also be safe if they were in the lower floor of buildings shielded from the flash of radiation."

The publication of *Must We Hide?* is a definite contribution to the program of public education recommended by the Office of Civil Defense Planning in a report submitted to the Secretary of Defense several months ago:

"Education of the public in respect to the *true* potentials and *actual* limitations of atomic warfare is the only means by which the civil population may be adequately prepared to meet the eventualities of atomic attack. Prompt development and implementation of such an educational program is a major undertaking of vital importance to national security."

"It is generally agreed that the psychological aspects of atomic warfare are of maximum military significance. No previous type of warfare has offered such rich opportunities to exploit fear of the unseen and the unknown. It is, therefore, obvious that the primary objective of a program of education of the public in respect to atomic warfare should be to dispel the current unjustified fear of the radiological hazards involved in such warfare and to develop a wholesome understanding of and respect for the potentials of atomic weapons."

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A Letter of Instruction

IN THE WAKE OF THE EBB TIDE FOLLOWING World War I the United States suddenly was faced with a serious crime wave, characterized by widespread bank and mail robberies. At that time the Post Office Department had no method of coping with mail robberies and as the seriousness of the situation increased the Postmaster General finally decided to call on the President of the United States for some kind of protection for the mails. In due course, the Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby, found a directive forthcoming from President Harding, which instructed him to detail as guards for the United States mails a sufficient number of officers and men of the United States Marine Corps to protect the mails from depredations by robbers and bandits. The directive was dated November 7, 1921.

Mr Denby then turned to Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune who, when apprised of this mission for the Corps, directed the formation of 22 detachment guard companies for the express purpose of forming a nation-wide system of mail protection. The total strength of the 22 companies when formed amounted to 53 officers and 2,200 enlisted men.

It will be recalled by most students of United States history that very shortly after the Marines began to guard the mails the robberies ceased. In fact, by March of the following year conditions were so much improved that the Marines were relieved of their responsibility. While the sudden decision to use Marines to guard the mails, and the hurried deployment of the 22 detachment guard companies to strategic key cities from which they operated, were not without a certain dramatic effect, the duty involved was at best somewhat tedious, especially after routine had been established. Nonetheless, the mails went through, safe and sound.

The remarkable record of the United States Marines in guarding the mails may be attributed to many things—readiness, state of training, esprit, attention to duty, courage, and so on. It is not particularly profitable at this late date to try to analyze the factors which may have contributed to their achievement. The fact remains however that the success of the Marines in this instance may have been at least partially inspired by the following letter, written by Secretary of the Navy Denby, on

November 11, 1921, and addressed to the "Men of the Mail Guard."

"I am proud that my old Corps has been chosen for a duty so honorable and so hard as that of protecting the United States mail. I am very anxious that you shall successfully accomplish your mission. It is not going to be easy work. It will always be dangerous and generally tiresome. You know how to do it. Be sure you do it well. I know you will neither fear nor shirk any duty, however hazardous or exacting.

"This particular work will lack the excitement and glamor of war duty, but it will be no less important. It has the same element of service to the country.

"I look with proud confidence to you to show now the qualities that have made the Corps so well-beloved by our fellow citizens.

"You must be brave, as you always are. You must be constantly alert. You must, when on guard duty, keep your weapons in hand and, if attacked, shoot and shoot to kill. There is no compromise in this battle with the bandits.

"If two Marines, guarding a mail car, for example, are suddenly covered by a robber, neither must hold up his hands, but both must begin shooting at once. One may be killed, but the other will get the robber and save the mail. That is the spirit of the Corps. When our men go in as guards over mail, that mail must be delivered or there must be a Marine dead at the post of duty.

"To be sure of success, every Marine on this duty must be watchful as a cat, hour after hour, night after night, week after week. No Marine must drink a drop of intoxicating liquor. Every Marine must be most careful with whom he associates and what his occupations are off duty. There may be many tricks tried to get you and you must not be tricked. Look out for women. Never discuss the details of your duty with outsiders. Never give up to another the trust you are charged with.

"Never forget that the honor of the Corps is in your keeping. You have been given a great trust. I am confident you will prove that it has not been misplaced.

"I am proud of you and believe in you with all my heart." JRS